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Theses
•	 Over	the	last	quarter-century,	relations	between	Chișinau	and	Bucharest	
have	oscillated	between	very	close	cooperation	and	open	hostility.	At	any	
given	time,	their	nature	has	depended	both	on	the	short-term	political	in-
terests	of	Romania	and	Moldova,	as	well	as	on	who	currently	holds	power	
in	Chișinau	and	Bucharest.	From	the	perspective	of	Moldova,	whose	pro-
European	government	started	to	undertake	real	action	on	European	inte-
gration	in	2009,	Romania	has	become	an	important	partner	for	facilitating	
contacts	with	the	West,	as	well	as	being	a	source	of	support.	For	this	reason,	
the	Moldovan	government	 is	 interested	 in	maintaining	 the	best	possible	
relations	with	its	western	neighbour,	and	in	suppressing	and	minimising	
any	tensions	between	them.	If	pro-Russian	groups	take	power	in	Moldova,	
this	would	very	 likely	 lead	 to	 the	unthawing	 of	 the	 countries’	 currently	
suppressed	problems,	and	a	serious	deterioration	in	the	relationship,	be-
cause	these	forces	will	emphasise	the	individuality	of	the	Moldovan	people	
and	stoke	anti-Romanian	sentiments.
•	 Romania	and	Moldova	have	developed	very	strong	 ties,	mainly	resulting	
from	their	many	years	of	common	history	(including	joint	statehood),	lan-
guage,	and	cultural	heritage.	On	the	one	hand	this	closeness	fosters	bilater-
al	relations,	but	on	the	other	hand	it	also	places	them	under	a	serious	bur-
den.	This	is	because	Moldovan	statehood	and	identity	has	somehow	been	
constructed	in	opposition	to	the	statehood	and	identity	of	Romania.	A	large	
part	of	the	population	(particularly	the	Russian-speaking	minority)	fears	
closer	cooperation	with	Bucharest,	seeing	this	as	threatening	a	loss	of	inde-
pendence	and	possible	unification	with	Moldova’s	western	neighbour.	The	
resulting	problems	affect	all	areas	of	bilateral	relations,	political,	military,	
and	(to	a	lesser	extent)	economic.	This	makes	it	harder	to	find	solutions	to	
the	problems	which	are	most	important	from	Moldova’s	perspective,	such	
as	the	signing	of	a	‘basic	and	border’	treaty	with	Romania.
•	 For	 years	Romania	has	 declared	 that	Moldova	 is	 a	 priority	 of	 its	 foreign	
policy.	Besides	 its	 traditional	 goals,	 consolidating	 its	 position	within	 the	
EU	and	NATO	and	its	partnership	with	the	US,	Romania	is	trying	to	make	
Moldova	one	of	the	main	focuses	of	its	international	activity.	The	primary	
objective	of	Romanian	policy	towards	Moldova	is	to	reinforce	the	 latter’s	
position	within	 the	 system	of	Western	 institutions	 and	 its	 international	
links.	At	the	same	time,	Romania	is	trying	to	prevent	any	attempt	at	deep-
ening	Moldovan	integration	in	the	structures	backed	by	Russia,	primarily	
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the	Eurasian	Economic	Union.	Bucharest	is	seeking	to	achieve	these	goals	
not	only	on	 the	political	 and	diplomatic	 levels,	but	also	by	 increasing	 its	
economic	ties	with	Moldova.	In	Chișinau’s	opinion,	Bucharest’s	actions	are	
also	focused	on	supporting	the	processes	of	 ‘re-Romanianising’	Moldova,	
which	should	be	seen	as	an	element	of	building	Romanian	‘soft	power’.	De-
spite	Bucharest’s	consistent	permanent	political	objectives,	however,	Ro-
mania	has	not	displayed	any	coherent	strategy	towards	Moldova,	and	its	
policy	 towards	Moldova	has	been	very	much	a	 function	of	domestic,	not	
foreign	policy.	Bucharest’s	political	objectives	are	often	subordinated	to	ri-
valry	among	Romanian	political	parties.
•	 Although	Romania	has	played	a	generally	positive	role	in	drawing	Moldova	
towards	Western	 structures	 and	has	 been	 effective	 in	 its	 actions,	 its	 ef-
fectiveness	in	other	areas	of	bilateral	cooperation	remains	negligible.	The	
technical	 support	Bucharest	has	 given	 is	 less	 than	necessary,	 and	 infra-
structure	projects	have	been	seriously	delayed,	as	a	result	of	problems	in	
coordinating	actions	among	the	relevant	ministries,	among	other	 issues.	
This	has	 led	 to	a	very	wide	gap	between	 the	very	wide-ranging	and	 fre-
quent	declarations	of	support	for	Moldova	issuing	from	Bucharest	and	the	
actual	results.
•	 From	Chișinau’s	perspective,	Romania	is	a	vital	counterweight	to	Russian	
influence.	The	Moldovan	groups	which	came	to	power	in	2009,	preaching	
the	idea	of	European	integration	and	reducing	Russian	influence,	naturally	
turned	to	Bucharest,	seeing	it	as	an	agent	and	advocate	for	Chișinau	in	the	
EU.	For	the	same	reason	the	Communists,	who	held	power	in	2001-2009,	
decided	to	take	a	moderately	pro-Romanian	turn	after	a	significant	dete-
rioration	in	relations	with	Russia	in	2003.	Cooperation	with	Romania	offers	
Moldova	the	prospect	of	reducing	not	only	its	political	but	also	its	economic	
and	energy	dependence	on	Russia.	Bucharest’s	possibilities	are	limited:	the	
Romanian	market	is	not	able	to	replace	the	Russian	market,	and	the	pro-
jects	for	energy	cooperation,	despite	being	promoted	for	many	years,	have	
so	far	only	had	a	symbolic	effect.	Bucharest	is	also	often	seen	on	the	inter-
national	 stage	as	 a	 representative	of	Moldova’s	 interests	 in	 international	
organisations,	as	well	as	a	source	of	financial	aid	and	the	know-how	neces-
sary	for	the	implementation	of	reforms.	At	the	same	time,	the	Romanian	
question	is	one	of	the	major	keystones	of	internal	policy	in	Moldova,	and	
individual	Moldovan	groups	regularly	exploit	it	for	their	own	political	in-
terests,	which	in	turn	influences	the	state	of	the	country’s	relations	with	
Bucharest.
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•	 The	rhetoric	of	unification	used	by	senior	Romanian	politicians	(including	
the	former	President	Traian	Băsescu,	and	to	a	lesser	extent	Prime	Minister	
Victor	Ponta)	provide	propaganda	fuel	for	those	political	forces	in	Moldova	
and	elsewhere	(especially	Russia)	which	oppose	the	process	of	Chișinau’s	
moves	towards	the	West.	The	proclamation	of	pro-unification	slogans	plac-
es	the	ruling	pro-European	coalition	in	Moldova	in	a	difficult	situation,	by	
strengthening	the	arguments	of	the	opposition	parties	(including	the	So-
cialist	Party	of	Igor	Dodon,	and	the	Communists),	whose	politicians	have	
long	insisted	to	the	public	that	the	project	of	European	integration	is	calcu-
lated	to	bring	about	the	‘Romanianisation’	of	Moldova,	depriving	it	of	inde-
pendence	and	forcing	it	into	NATO	by	the	back	door.	Moscow	has	also	used	
the	declarations	flowing	from	Bucharest	as	an	argument	against	Romania	
and	the	EU	becoming	involved	in	Moldova.	Moscow	also	argues	that	unifi-
cation	would	imply	the	enlargement	of	NATO,	which	would	consequently	
pose	a	 threat	 to	Russian	 interests.	The	narrative	of	unification	also	rais-
es	 tensions	among	Moldova’s	 ethnic	minorities	 (primarily	 in	 the	Gagauz	
Autonomy,	which	 is	 traditionally	 antipathetic	 towards	 Romanians),	 and	
makes	the	relationship	with	the	authorities	of	the	breakaway	Transnistria	
more	difficult.
•	 The	 idea	 of	Moldovan-Romanian	 unification	 in	 the	 foreseeable	 future	 is	
unrealistic,	for	political,	economic,	and	social	reasons.	The	main	political	
forces	in	Moldova,	regardless	of	their	pro-Western	or	pro-Russian	sympa-
thies,	are	not	interested	in	giving	up	independence	in	the	name	of	creating	
a	common	state.	Moldovan	politicians	realise	 that	 linking	 the	 two	coun-
tries	in	a	unitary	model	would	deprive	them	of	their	positions	and	future	
career	prospects,	and	would	also	jeopardise	their	political	and	business	in-
terests.	The	vast	majority	of	Moldovan	society	also	opposes	the	idea,	with	
particular	resistance	coming	from	among	the	Russian-speaking	minority	
and	the	separatist	area	of	Transnistria.	Contrary	to	their	political	declara-
tions,	the	ruling	elites	in	Bucharest	are	also	not	interested	in	the	real	unifi-
cation	of	Romania	and	Moldova.	Their	unionist	narrative	is	predominantly	
propaganda,	aimed	for	domestic	consumption,	and	is	intended	primarily	to	
mobilise	voters	and	emphasise	their	own	patriotism.	In	addition,	the	cost	
of	such	a	project	would	exceed	Romania’s	financial	capacity.	Another	con-
siderable	obstacle	is	also	the	clear	opposition	of	the	relevant	international	
actors,	primarily	Russia	and	(informally)	the	EU.
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InTroducTIon
Romania’s	interest	in	Moldova	is	mainly	based	on	historical	and	cultural	factors.	
In	the	eyes	of	most	Romanians,	Moldovans	are	compatriots	who	were	forcibly	
separated	from	the	motherland,	firstly	in	1812	when	Bessarabia	was	incorporat-
ed	into	the	Russian	Empire,	then	in	1940,	when	after	more	than	twenty	years	as	
part	of	Romania,	those	lands	were	incorporated	into	the	USSR	by	the	Molotov-
Ribbentrop	pact1.	Moldova’s	territories	are	seen	in	Romania	as	historical	Roma-
nian	land.	This	sentiment	is	also	reflected	in	the	policy	of	Bucharest.	Officially,	
relations	with	Chișinau	are	considered	as	special,	and	representatives	of	the	
Romanian	political	class	outdo	each	other	in	their	declarations	of	assistance	and	
support	for	their	eastern	neighbour,	referring	to	a	shared	national,	cultural	and	
linguistic	community.	In	practice,	however,	Romanian	policy	towards	Moldova	
(and	by	extension	the	two	countries’	political	relations)	is	most	often	shaped,	
not	by	sentiment,	but	by	a	political	pragmatism	resulting	from	the	desire	to	win	
the	support	of	the	Romanian	electorate,	among	other	factors.
Meanwhile,	for	Moldova,	Romania	is	not	only	a	culturally	and	historically	close	
neighbour,	but	also	the	most	important	point	of	reference	in	the	ongoing	debate	
about	Moldovan	identity	over	the	last	quarter-century.	Moldova’s	approach	to	
Romania	and	the	Romanian	cultural	heritage	defines	the	political	and	ideologi-
cal	dividing	lines	within	it	much	more	clearly	than	the	approach	to	economic	
or	social	questions.
All	of	this	means	that	in	order	to	understand	the	complexity	of	Moldovan-
Romanian	relations,	 it	 is	necessary	first	of	all	 to	be	familiar	with	the	his-
torical	context	which	largely	shapes	the	current	relationship	between	the	
two	countries.	This	is	essential	to	understanding	most	elements	of	contem-
porary	Romanian-Moldovan	discourse,	including	the	Moldovan	dispute	over	
its	identity,	and	the	separatism	problem	within	Moldova.	The	first	chapter	of	
this	work	is	dedicated	to	presenting	the	historical	conditions,	the	turbulent	
political	relations	between	Chișinau	and	Bucharest	in	the	more	than	two	dec-
ades	since	the	collapse	of	the	Soviet	Union,	and	the	ensuing	discussion	of	the	
problems	of	bilateral	relations.
1	 On	the	attitude	of	Romanians	towards	Moldovans	and	Moldova,	see	Republica	Moldova	în	
conştiinţa	 publică	 românească	 at	 http://www.fundatia.ro/sites/default/files/Studiu%20
Moldova.pdf	 and	 Studiu	 privind	 starea	 socială	 şi	 identitatea	 naţională	 în	 România,	 at	
http://www.rgnpress.ro/rgn_12/images/stories/2012/08/11-sondaj_CRSS.pdf
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Subsequent	chapters	present	the	contemporary	significance	of	Moldova	for	Bu-
charest	and	Romania’s	role	in	Chișinau’s	politics,	including	the	objectives	and	
instruments	of	the	policies	each	pursues	towards	the	other.	This	section	also	
discusses	the	current	state	of	Romanian-Moldovan	relations	in	individual	fields	
such	as	economy,	culture	and	defence.
The	sixth	chapter	concerns	the	concept	of	the	reunification	of	Moldova	and	
Romania	which	regularly	arises	in	public	debate	in	both	countries	(and	also	
beyond	their	borders).	In	this	section,	this	idea,	the	(im)probability	of	its	imple-
mentation,	and	its	role	in	Moldovan,	Romanian	and	Russian	politics	is	subjected	
to	extensive	evaluation.
This	text	closes	with	an	attempt	to	outline	the	future	of	Romanian-Moldovan	
relations	in	the	foreseeable	future.
10
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 0
9/
20
15
I. romanIan-moldovan relaTIons In a hIsTorIcal 
perspecTIve
1. historical background
The	area	of	today’s	Moldova	(with	the	exception	of	the	Transnistrian	terri-
tories,	situated	on	the	left	bank	of	the	Dniester)	is	part	of	the	historical	area	
known	as	Bessarabia,	which	from	the	second	half	of	the	fourteenth	century	
until	1812	was	part	of	the	Principality	of	Moldavia	(Principatul	Moldovei),	one	
of	the	two	historical	Romanian	states	(along	with	Wallachia).	In	1812,	these	
lands,	along	with	the	whole	of	Bessarabia	(including	Bugeac,	Hotim	and	the	
surrounding	areas,	as	well	as	today’s	right-bank	Moldova)	were	incorporated	
into	the	Russian	Empire.	As	a	result,	the	people	living	in	them	were	isolated	
from	the	nation-	and	state-building	processes	taking	place	in	the	rest	of	the	
Principality	of	Moldavia	and	Wallachia,	which	were	unified	in	1881	to	form	the	
Kingdom	of	Romania2.	This	had	a	huge	impact	on	the	identity	of	the	residents	
of	Bessarabia.	At	the	same	time,	the	Russian	authorities	introduced	a	pro-
gramme	of	intensive	Russification	to	the	newly	annexed	areas.	In	1826	they	
prohibited	the	use	of	the	Romanian	language	in	local	administration,	church	
liturgy	and	education.	They	displaced	the	 indigenous	populations	and	en-
couraged	representatives	of	other	ethnic	groups	to	settle	in	the	territories	of	
Bessarabia3.	As	a	result,	there	was	a	mass	influx	into	the	cities	of	Slavic,	Jew-
ish,	German	and	Armenian	populations,	and	it	is	these	groups	that	came	to	
make	up	the	majority	of	the	region’s	intellectual	and	economic	elite.	The	pro-
cess	of	Russification	facilitated	a	state	of	affairs	where	up	to	95%	of	the	ethnic	
Moldovan	community	consisted	of	illiterate	peasants.	As	a	result	of	Russia’s	
actions,	the	percentage	of	the	population	declaring	themselves	as	Moldovans	
in	Bessarabia	fell	from	86%	in	1817	to	56%	in	18974.
2	 The	process	of	unifying	the	Romanian	state,	in	fact,	lasted	more	than	twenty	years.	In	1859	
there	was	the	so-called	‘Small	Unification’	(Rom.	Mica	Unire),	the	formal	merger	into	a	sin-
gle	state	of	the	Principality	of	Moldavia	(without	Bessarabia)	and	Wallachia.	From	1862	the	
newly	created	state	was	named	Romania,	while	the	Kingdom	of	Romania	only	came	into	
being	in	1881.
3	 On	the	history	of	Bessarabia	after	joining	the	Russian	Empire,	see	among	others	C.	King,	
The	Moldovans:	Romania,	Russia,	and	the	Politics	of	Culture,	Stanford	2000;	Ş.	Ciobanu,	Ba-
sarabia.	Populaţia.	Istoria.	Cultura,	Bucureşti-Chişinău,	1992;	A.	Gil,	Bessarabia.	Wschod-
nia	Mołdawia	jako	gubernia	Cesarstwa	Rosyjskiego	(1812–1918)	[Bessarabia.	Eastern	Mol-
dova	 as	 a	 gubernia	 of	 the	 Russian	 Empire	 (1812-1918)],	 in	 Spotkania	 polsko-mołdawskie	
[Polish-Moldovan	encounters],	ed.	M.	Kosienkowski,	Lublin	2013.
4	 I.	Nistor,	Istoria	Basarabiei.	Editie	şi	studio	bio-bibliografic	de	Stelian	Neagoe,	Bucharest	1991.
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In	1918,	the	areas	of	Bessarabia,	Transylvania,	the	Banat	and	Bukovina	were	an-
nexed	to	Romania.	This	event	was	called	‘the	Great	Unification’	(Marea	Unire),	
and	in	the	historical	memory	of	the	Romanians	it	initiated	a	golden	age	in	the	
history	of	the	country,	called	the	period	of	‘Great	Romania’,	which	lasted	until	
World	War	II.
Bucharest	quite	quickly	took	action	to	promote	Romanian	identity	among	the	
inhabitants	of	the	newly	unified	provinces,	but	did	not	have	either	the	financial	
resources	or	sufficient	numbers	of	trained	educational	and	administrative	per-
sonnel	to	succeed	in	doing	so5.	As	a	result,	attempts	to	‘Romanianise’	Moldova	
more	often	stoked	tensions	among	the	minorities	living	there	(especially	the	
Slavic,	and	to	a	lesser	extent	the	Gagauz	populations)	than	produced	any	real	
results6.	The	resistance	from	the	population	was	so	large	that	from	1918	to	1928	
Bucharest	was	forced	to	maintain	a	‘state	of	siege’	in	Moldova,	which	included	
restrictions	on	civil	rights,	expanding	the	competence	of	the	police,	and	increas-
ing	the	Romanian	military	presence	in	the	new	province7.
Meanwhile,	in	1924	the	Soviet	authorities	created	the	Moldavian	Autonomous	
Okrug	(district)	within	the	Ukrainian	SSR,	formed	by	combining	the	territory	
of	today’s	Transnistria	and	the	lands	east	of	it,	up	to	the	city	of	Bălți.	In	a	few	
months	this	was	renamed	the	Moldavian	Autonomous	Soviet	Socialist	Republic	
(MASSR).	This	area	had	never	been	part	of	the	Romanian	state,	and	only	about	
30%	of	the	population	there	spoke	Romanian8.	In	this	area,	a	new	Moldovan	na-
tional	identity	was	developed	under	the	auspices	of	Moscow	–	‘Moldovenism’	–	as	
an	alternative	to	the	Romanian	identity.	It	stated	that	the	Moldovans	were	a	na-
tion	separate	from	the	Romanians,	who	used	a	different	language	(Moldovan)	
5	 Another	problem	was	the	quality	of	personnel	sent	to	Bessarabia	by	the	authorities	in	Bu-
charest.	It	often	happened	that	officials	were	sent	to	the	newly	annexed	province	as	a	kind	
of	punishment.
6	 During	Romanian	rule	over	Bessarabia	there	were	three	major	uprisings	against	the	gov-
ernment	in	Bucharest.	The	first	took	place	near	Hotim	in	1919,	and	the	second	(in	the	same	
year)	in	Tighina	(Rus.	Bender).	The	third	occurred	(most	likely	at	the	inspiration	of	Mos-
cow)	in	1924	in	Bugeac.	All	these	incidents	were	suppressed	relatively	quickly	by	the	Roma-
nian	army.
7	 See	 for	more	 detail	 S.	 Suveica,	 Basarabia	 în	 primul	 deceniu	 interbelic	 (1918–1928):	Mod-
ernizare	prin	reforme;	G.	Cojocaru,	Integrarea	Basarabiei	in	cadrul	Romaniei	(1918–1923),	
Bucharest	1997;	E.	Enciu,	Basarabia	în	anii	1918–1940:	Evolutie	demografică	şi	economică,	
Chișinau	1998,	and	also	partly	in	J.	Solak,	Mołdawia.	Republika	na	trzy	pęknięta	[Moldova.	
A	republic	broken	into	three],	Toruń	2009.
8	 C.	Pantea,	The	Ethno-Demographic	Evolution	of	Moldavian	Autonomous	Soviet	 Socialist	
Republic,	Codrul Cosminului,	2008,	vol.	14,	p.	170.
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written	in	the	Cyrillic	and	not	the	Romanian	Latin	alphabet,	and	the	Moldovan	
state	was	claimed	to	have	descended	in	a	straight	line	from	the	fourteenth-
century	Principality	of	Moldavia,	and	was	its	direct	successor	state.	According	
to	adherents	of	Moldovenism,	the	Moldovans	living	in	the	lands	on	the	right	
bank	of	the	Prut	succumbed	to	full	Romanianisation	after	the	establishment	of	
the	Kingdom	of	Romania,	and	only	the	residents	of	Bessarabia	retained	their	
identity.	They	also	emphasised	that	the	Moldovan	nation,	as	opposed	to	the	
Romanian,	was	formed	on	a	multi-ethnic	territory,	inhabited	to	a	large	extent	
by	Slavic	peoples,	thanks	to	which	it	was	blessed	with	an	innate	tolerance	for	
multiculturalism	and	multilingualism9.
In	1940,	under	the	Molotov-Ribbentrop	Pact,	the	whole	of	Bessarabia	(and	thus	
also	the	territory	of	modern	Moldova)	and	northern	Bukovina	were	annexed	
to	the	USSR.	The	MASSR	was	abolished,	and	in	its	place	the	Moldavian	Soviet	
Socialist	Republic	(MSSR)	was	established,	joining	Transnistria	to	a	substantial	
part	of	the	Romanian	territories	annexed10.	In	1941,	thanks	to	its	alliance	with	
the	Third	Reich,	Romania	managed	to	regain	its	lost	territory,	as	well	as	taking	
more	land	east	of	the	southern	Bug	riverfrom	the	Ukrainian	SSR.	Over	the	next	
three	years,	under	the	regime	of	General	Ion	Antonescu,	Romania	exterminated	
about	200,000	Romanian	and	Bessarabian	Jews	and	Roma	in	the	area	between	
the	Dniester	and	the	Southern	Bug	(known	as	the	Transnistria	Governorate	[Ro.	
Guvernământul	Transnistriei).
In	1944,	as	a	result	of	the	Red	Army’s	counteroffensive,	the	area	was	returned	to	
the	USSR.	The	Soviet	authorities	embarked	on	policies	of	large-scale	de-Romani-
anisation	and	Moldavianisation	of	the	MSSR.	The	relatively	few	pro-Romanian	
activists	who	remained	in	the	republic	after	the	annexation	were	sent	to	the	
Soviet	Union	or	shot.	This	was	also	the	fate	of	the	landowners,	clergy	and	any	of	
the	intelligentsia	associated	with	Romania.	In	the	period	from	1940	to	1941	alone,	
more	than	30,000	people	were	deported	or	arrested,	and	another	50,000-55,000	
were	sent	to	forced	labour	throughout	the	USSR11.	After	the	Soviet	army	re-oc-
cupied	Bessarabia,	the	repression	continued.	From	1944	until	1951	about	40,000	
people	(about	1.5%	of	all	Bessarabia’s	 inhabitants)	were	deported	(mainly	to	
9	 For	more	on	the	history	of	the	MASSR	and	the	emergence	of	the	idea	of	‘Moldovenism’,	see	
E.	Negru,	Politica	etnoculturală	în	RASS	Moldovenească,	Chișinau	2003.
10	 The	inclusion	of	part	of	the	territories	of	the	MASSR	into	the	new	republic	legitimised	the	
existence	of	 the	Moldavian	SSR,	 and	meant	 that	 the	existing	Soviet	political	 elite	of	 the	
MASSR	could	be	used	to	build	the	new	union	republic.
11	 A.	Moraru,	Istoria	Romanilor.	Basarabi	şi	Transnistria,	Chișinau	1995,	p.	337.
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Central	Asia)	as	part	of	the	process	of	de-kulakisation,	for	political	or	religious	
reasons.	Another	tool	for	breaking	social	resistance	was	the	great	famine	that	
struck	the	MSSR	in	1946-7,	which	claimed	between	150,000	and	200,000	vic-
tims	(about	6-7%	of	the	population)12.	In	this	way,	Moldova	underwent	deep	
Sovietisation	within	the	space	of	just	a	few	years13.	The	process	of	imposing	
a	new	identity	was	aided	by	the	bilingualism	of	the	urban	centres	constituting	
the	heart	of	the	country’s	intellectual	and	economic	life,	which	had	continued	
since	the	imperial	period,	together	with	the	very	low	cultural	self-awareness	
of	the	rural	population.	The	small	underground	opposition	was	marginal,	and	
was	unable	to	withstand	the	decisive	actions	of	the	Soviet	authorities.	It	was	
not	until	the	late	1980s,	as	a	result	of	the	changes	taking	place	within	the	USSR,	
that	a	revival	of	the	Romanian	national	idea	began	in	the	MSSR.
The	complex	historical	past	of	the	current	territory	of	Moldova	still	shapes	the	
similarly	complex	relationship	between	the	inhabitants	of	Romania	and	Mol-
dova.	Romanians	perceive	the	vast	majority	of	ethnic	Moldovans	as	members	of	
the	Romanian	people,	and	see	Moldovan	identity	as	merely	a	kind	of	Romanian	
regional	identity	(like	the	identities	of	Wallachia	or	Transylvania).	There	is	also	
a	common	conviction	that	the	present	Moldovan	Republic	has	a	Romanian	char-
acter	deriving	from	the	historical	past.	In	a	survey	conducted	in	June	2012	by	
the	Centrul	Român	de	Studii	şi	Strategii,	almost	70%	of	the	Romanians	surveyed	
felt	that	the	residents	of	Bessarabia	are	primarily	‘Romanians’,	while	85%	felt	
that	this	area	is	Romanian	land14.
On	the	other	hand,	the	attitude	of	Moldovans	towards	Romanians	is	ambivalent,	
ranging	from	unconditional	sympathy	to	an	antipathy	sometimes	bordering	on	
hatred.	Many	ethnic	Moldovans	(which,	according	to	the	2004	census,	76%	of	
the	population	believe	themselves	to	be,	while	only	2-3%	consider	themselves	
Romanians)	acknowledge	the	cultural,	historical	and	linguistic	ties	between	
their	country	and	Romania,	but	only	some	of	them	directly	identify	with	the	
Romanian	element15.	Members	of	this	group	are	usually	favourably	or	neutrally	
12	 A.	Ţăranu,	Голод в Молдове (1946–1947).	Cборник документов.	Chișinau	1993,	p.	10.
13	 For	more	about	 the	period	of	Stalinist	 repression	and	 the	Sovietisation	of	 the	MSSR,	see	
V.	Stavila,	De	la	Basarabia	romaneasca	la	Basarabia	sovietica,	1939–1945,	Chișinau	2000;	and	
E.	Şişcanu,	Basarabia	sub	regimul	bolșevic	(1940–1952),	Bucharest	1998.
14	 http://www.rgnpress.ro/rgn_12/images/stories/2012/08/11-sondaj_CRSS.pdf
15	 In	a	study	conducted	in	October	2009	among	residents	of	Moldova	(omitting	Transnistria),	
respondents	were	asked	to	indicate	the	degree	of	similarity	between	Moldovan	and	Roma-
nian	identity	on	a	scale	from	1	to	5,	where	1	meant	that	the	two	were	identical,	and	5	that	
14
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 0
9/
20
15
inclined	towards	Romania16.	A	specific	group	of	Moldovan	residents	(both	Mol-
dovans	who	see	themselves	as	a	nation	separate	from	the	Romanians,	and	the	
ethnic	minorities),	because	of	the	education	they	received	in	the	Soviet	period,	
sees	Romania	as	a	historical	occupying	power,	which	twice	(in	1918,	and	then	
in	alliance	with	Hitler	in	1941)	annexed	Bessarabia	unlawfully	and	attempted	
to	‘Romanianise’	its	inhabitants	by	force.	It	is	mostly	the	representatives	of	this	
group	who	see	Romania	as	a	threat	to	the	sovereignty	of	the	Moldovan	state.
2. The Bessarabian question in communist romania
In	the	early	years	of	Communist	Romania,	the	Bessarabian	question	was	not	
raised	in	public	space,	and	constituted	a	kind	of	taboo.	Both	the	annexation	of	
Bessarabia	by	the	Russian	Empire	in	1812,	and	in	particular	the	re-annexation	
by	the	USSR	of	these	areas	of	Romania	in	1940,	remained	forbidden	subjects	
for	political	reasons17,	even	though	the	subject	remained	alive	in	the	collective	
memory	of	the	Romanian	people.	However,	the	taboos	began	to	be	broken	in	the	
late	1950s	and	early	1960s.	This	was	part	of	the	programme	initiated	by	Gheo-
rghe	Gheorghiu-Dej,	the	then	leader	of	Romania,	of	Bucharest’s	limited	eman-
cipation	from	the	Soviet	Union.	After	Nicolae	Ceaușescu	came	to	power	in	1967,	
interest	in	the	Bessarabian	question	in	Romania	increased.	Bucharest	began	
to	consider	the	Kremlin’s	policy	towards	the	Moldavian	SSR	with	increasing	
interest.	Romanian	diplomats	accredited	in	Moscow	were	ordered	to	monitor	
and	analyse	Soviet	officials’	speeches	for	references	to	Bessarabia	and	Buko-
vina.	The	Romanian	Securitate	secret	service	also	received	similar	instructions.	
At	the	same	time,	the	outdated	radio	and	television	transmitter	located	in	Iași	
was	modernised	so	that	its	broadcasts	could	cover	the	entire	territory	of	the	
Moldovan	SSR.	Then,	it	began	broadcasting	radio	and	television	programmes	
which	emphasised	the	common	historical	and	cultural	ties	between	the	Roma-
nians	on	both	banks	of	the	Prut.	These	transmissions	were	directed	equally	to	
the	citizens	of	Soviet	Moldova	and	the	Romanians,	who	were	thus	reminded	of	
Romania’s	rights	to	historical	Bessarabia.	In	the	1960s	censorship	of	publica-
tions	justifying	the	Soviet	claim	to	these	areas	also	began.
Moldovan	was	completely	different	from	Romanian.	Almost	26%	chose	a	rating	of	‘1’	or	‘2’,	
while	47%	indicated	‘5’	or	‘4’.	http://www.interlic.md/download/988/
16	 Nevertheless,	 identifying	oneself	 as	 a	Bessarabian	Romanian	does	not	necessarily	mean	
(and	often	does	not	mean)	one	has	any	sympathy	for	the	Romanian	state.
17	 It	was	awkward	for	the	Romanian	Communist	Party	to	criticise	the	Soviet	Union	over	the	
annexation	of	Bessarabia,	not	only	for	political	reasons,	but	also	because	even	in	the	1920s,	
the	party	had	officially	supported	the	idea	of	ceding	these	lands	to	the	USSR.
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At	the	same	time	the	Bessarabian	question	was	raised	more	and	more	boldly	in	
Romanian	science.	Scientists	started	not	only	to	talk	and	write	openly	about	the	
annexation	of	Bessarabia	by	the	USSR,	but	they	even	called	this	event	‘an	act	of	
Soviet	imperialism’	or	‘Soviet	occupation’	directly18.	The	Romanian	character	
of	the	lands	beyond	the	Prut	began	to	be	openly	emphasised,	and	their	history	
was	also	included	in	studies	of	the	history	of	Romania.
The	subject	of	the	illegality	of	the	annexation	and	Romania’s	rights	to	Bessara-
bia	was	also	raised	at	the	political	 level.	During	the	party	congress	in	1965,	
Ceaușescu	discussed	a	letter	written	by	Friedrich	Engels	in	1888	in	which	he	
criticised	the	occupation	of	Bessarabia	by	the	Russian	Empire	in	1812.	A	year	
later,	also	during	the	party	congress,	Ceaușescu	publicly	condemned	the	Ro-
manian	Communist	Party’s	support	(declared	in	the	1920s)	for	the	annexation	
of	Bessarabia.
The	successive	 leaders	of	Communist	Romania	appealed	to	the	Bessarabian	
question	not	as	the	result	of	genuine	resentment,	or	of	any	real	desire	to	draw	
Chișinau	and	Bucharest	closer	together.	Rather,	this	was	an	instrument	of	in-
ternal	policy,	and	to	a	limited	extent,	also	of	foreign	policy	towards	the	Soviet	
Union.	Raising	the	subject	of	Bessarabia	was	a	way	of	highlighting	the	country’s	
independence	from	Soviet	influence	and	building	up	political	and	social	support	
inside	the	country.	In	addition,	it	intensified	nationalist	sentiments	within	the	
country,	consolidated	society,	and	distracted	the	public’s	attention	from	Roma-
nia’s	gradually	deteriorating	economic	situation.	To	a	limited	extent,	it	was	also	
an	instrument	for	putting	pressure	on	the	Soviet	Union,	which	Bucharest	used	
whenever	relations	with	Moscow	deteriorated19.	Active	propaganda	activities	or	
political	gestures	by	Romania	in	relation	to	the	inhabitants	of	the	MSSR	could	
also	provoke	unrest	among	the	pro-Romanian	part	of	the	population	of	these	
areas.	To	avoid	such	situations,	the	Soviet	authorities	were	sometimes	willing	
to	make	small	concessions	to	Bucharest.
18	 M.	Musat	and	I.	Ardeleanu,	who	published	the	book	Viata	politica	în	Romania	1918–1921	in	
Bucharest	in	1976,	not	only	used	the	term	‘Soviet	occupation’	in	the	context	of	the	annexa-
tion	of	Bessarabia,	but	also	explicitly	stated	that	it	had	occurred	“as	a	result	of	the	Soviet-
Fascist	pact	of	1939”.
19	 The	tendency	to	raise	the	Moldovan	issue	to	consolidate	Romanian	society,	demonstrating	
Romania’s	international	independence	and	building	public	support	for	the	ruling	elite,	did	
not	end	with	 the	end	of	Communism	 in	Romania,	and	 indeed	still	occurs	 (possibly	even	
more	strongly	than	in	the	past)	in	modern	times,	which	will	be	discussed	later	in	this	text.
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3. romanian-moldovan relations after 1991
In	the	late	eighties	and	early	nineties,	the	wave	of	perestroika	led	to	increasingly	
frequent	and	numerous	demonstrations	in	the	MSSR,	organised	by	the	Moldo-
van	Popular	Front	(FPM).	This	movement,	established	in	1989,	was	a	conglom-
eration	of	reformist,	democratic	and	anti-Communist	organisations	from	across	
the	republic	(initially	Transnistria	and	Gagauzia	were	represented	as	well),	
wherein	the	dominant	role	was	played	by	representatives	of	the	pro-Romanian	
Moldovan	intelligentsia:	writers,	professors	and	journalists.	Its	activists	called	
for	the	Romanian	national	and	cultural	revival	of	the	indigenous	people	of	Mol-
dova.	On	27	August	1989,	in	the	central	square	of	Chișinau,	the	FPM	organised	
a	rally	of	about	300,000	people,	which	was	later	named	the	Grand	National	
Assembly	(Marea	Adunare	Naţională)20.	As	a	result,	on	31	August	1989	the	au-
thorities	adopted	a	law	requiring	the	use	of	the	Latin	script	when	writing	the	
Moldovan	language.	Hitherto	the	language,	which	from	the	linguistic	point	
of	view	is	the	same	as	Romanian,	had	been	written	entirely	in	Cyrillic.	In	the	
first	partially	free	elections	to	the	local	parliament	in	1990,	the	FPM	managed	
to	form	a	coalition	together	with	some	of	the	reform-minded	Communists	and	
take	power.
Grassroots	community	initiatives	linking	both	banks	of	the	Prut	border	took	on	
more	and	more	momentum.	History	was	made	by	the	so-called	Bridge	of	Flow-
ers,	which	was	organised	on	6	May	199021.	For	a	few	hours,	the	requirement	for	
Romanians	to	have	a	passport	and	visa	to	travel	to	the	MSSR	was	suspended.	
Around	a	million	inhabitants	of	Romania	crossed	over	the	eight	border	bridges	
linking	the	two	countries,	bringing	flowers	with	them	and	throwing	them	into	
the	river22.	On	23	June	1990	Moldova	declared	its	sovereignty,	and	on	27	August	
1991,	the	parliament	in	Chișinau	adopted	a	declaration	of	independence,	which	
Romania	acknowledged	on	the	same	day.
The	festival	of	the	Romanian	national	revival	in	Moldova	was	met	by	firm	op-
position	 from	representatives	of	 the	Russian-speaking	minorities	 living	 in	
20	 The	square	where	 the	event	 took	place	 is	now	called	Piața	Marii	Adunări	Naționale	 (the	
Square	of	the	Grand	National	Assembly).
21	 On	the	renaissance	of	Moldovan-Romanian	relations	after	1990,	see	J.	Pieńkowski,	Dla	czego	
Rumunia	zawsze	będzie	kochać	Mołdawię?	[Why	will	Romania	always	love	Moldova?],	in	
Spotkania	Polsko-Mołdawskie	[Polish-Moldovan	encounters],	ed.	M.	Kosienkowski,	Lublin	
2013,	p.	157.
22	 A	second	such	event,	this	time	for	Moldovan	citizens,	took	place	on	16	June	1991.
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Moldova,	who	feared	marginalisation	(due	to	their	ignorance	of	the	Romanian	
language)	as	well	as	a	possible	merger	with	neighbouring	Romania.	This	re-
sistance	took	on	particular	intensity	in	the	Gagauzia	and	Transnistria	regions,	
which	have	predominantly	Russian-speaking	populations.	On	19	August	1990	
Gagauzia,	in	the	south	of	the	country,	renounced	its	allegiance	to	Chișinau,	
while	Transnistria	did	the	same	on	2	September	1990.	These	regions	declared	
themselves	to	be	Soviet	republics	belonging	to	the	USSR	and	independent	of	
Moldova.	The	secession	of	both	regions,	particularly	Transnistria	which	 is	
highly-industrialised	and	lies	on	strategic	trade	and	communication	routes,	
provoked	a	reaction	from	Chișinau.	In	March	1992,	full-blown	armed	hostilities	
(preceded	by	minor	skirmishes)	began	between	Moldovan	forces	and	Trans-
nistrian	volunteers,	supported	by	Russian	troops	stationed	in	the	region.	The	
subsequent	five-month	struggle,	which	claimed	the	lives	of	at	least	650	people	
on	both	sides,	represented	a	defeat	for	the	government	forces.	On	18	July	1992	
a	ceasefire	was	declared,	and	on	21	July	in	Moscow,	the	Moldovan	President	Mir-
cea	Snegur	signed	an	agreement	with	Boris	Yeltsin	ending	the	conflict23.	Thus,	
Chișinau	effectively	lost	all	control	over	the	territories	situated	on	the	left	bank	
of	the	Dniester,	as	well	as	the	right-bank	town	of	Bender	(in	Romanian,	Tighina).
After	1992	the	Moldovan	public’s	pro-Romanian	enthusiasm	began	to	wane	
quickly,	as	evidenced	by	the	early	parliamentary	elections	held	in	February	
1994.	The	Popular	Front	won	only	7.5%	of	the	vote,	and	the	Agrarian	Demo-
cratic	Party,	opposed	to	the	idea	of	unification	and	favouring	Moldovanisation,	
took	control	of	parliament,	winning	43%	of	the	votes.	After	the	formation	of	the	
new	government,	relations	with	Romania	began	to	cool.	A	key	event	was	the	
organisation,	at	the	request	of	President	Mircea	Snegur,	of	a	referendum	on	
6	March	1994	in	which	the	citizens	could	comment	on	their	desire	to	preserve	
the	independence	of	the	newly	created	Moldovan	Republic	(and	thus	declare	
indirectly	whether	they	favoured	possible	unification	with	Romania)24.	At	that	
23	 A	wide-ranging	and	objective	description	of	the	origins	of	Transnistrian	and	Gagauz	sepa-
ratism,	and	of	the	battles	themselves,	can	be	found	in	J.	Solak,	Mołdawia.	Republika	na	trzy	
pęknięta.	Historyczno-społeczny,	militarny	i	geopolityczny	wymiar	„zamrożonego	konflik-
tu”	o	Naddniestrze	[Moldova.	A	republic	broken	into	three.	The	historical	and	social,	mili-
tary	and	geopolitical	dimensions	of	the	‘frozen	conflict’	over	Transnistria],	Torun	2010.
24	 The	referendum	question	was:	‘Do	you	want	the	Republic	of	Moldova	to	develop	as	an	in-
dependent	and	unitary	country,	within	the	borders	established	on	the	day	of	the	Declara-
tion	of	Independence	(23	June	1990);	to	promote	a	policy	of	neutrality;	and	maintain	mutu-
ally	beneficial	economic	relations	with	all	countries	of	the	world	and	guarantee	its	citizens	
equal	rights,	in	accordance	with	the	norms	of	international	law?’.
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time,	independence	was	supported	by	almost	98%	of	the	citizens	of	Moldova25.	
The	new	government’s	next	steps	were	dictated	by	the	mandate	they	had	thus	
obtained,	which	laid	the	foundations	for	the	building	of	an	independent	state.	In	
July	1994,	a	constitution	was	adopted	in	which	Moldovan	and	not	Romanian	was	
designated	as	the	state’s	written	language.	A	year	later	a	new	national	anthem	
was	adopted,	abandoning	the	Romanian	national	anthem	which	had	been	used	
since	199126.	The	problem	of	Gagauzia	was	also	resolved;	it	was	given	the	status	
of	an	autonomy	within	Moldova,	and	was	at	the	same	time	guaranteed	the	right	
to	declare	independence	if	Chișinau	ever	decided	to	unite	with	Romania.	This	
was	a	clear	signal	that	the	Moldovan	authorities	were	not	considering	any	such	
step.	Bucharest	did	not	hide	its	disappointment	at	Chișinau’s	actions,	but	did	
not	take	any	visible	action	to	influence	Moldova’s	position	regarding	Romania.
The	situation	changed	again	in	1997-1998,	when	Petru	Lucinschi	became	presi-
dent,	and	the	Agrarian	Democratic	Party	was	replaced	by	a	coalition	of	three	
pro-Western	parties,	which	took	the	name	of	the	Alliance	for	a	Democratic	and	
Prosperous	Moldova27.	Romanian-Moldovan	relations	were	revived.	The	pro-
Western	course	declared	by	the	new	government	in	Chișinau	received	clear	sup-
port	from	Bucharest.	Numerous	bilateral	meetings	at	all	political	levels	resulted	
in	17	bilateral	agreements	being	signed.	April	2000	saw	the	initialling	of	a	treaty	
on	partnership	and	cooperation	(known	as	the	basic	and	border	treaty),	which	
had	been	negotiated	over	for	almost	seven	years28;	both	parties	unequivocally	
declared	a	special,	privileged	status	for	their	bilateral	relations,	resulting	from	
their	historical	past	and	their	linguistic	and	cultural	community.	The	agreement	
stated	that	the	partnership	between	Chișinau	and	Bucharest	must	be	built	on	
25	 This	result	was	due	to	several	factors.	The	key	reason	for	the	high	support	for	independence	
was	the	end	just	a	few	months	earlier	of	the	conflict	with	Transnistria	and	the	continuing	
tension	in	relations	between	Chișinau	and	Gagauzia.	The	residents	of	Moldova	realised	that	
moving	towards	unification	with	Romania	could	lead	to	the	outbreak	of	another	conflict.	
Another	no	less	important	reason	was	disappointment	in	the	attitude	of	Bucharest	which,	
despite	enormous	interest	in	the	idea	of	unification	in	the	early	nineties,	did	not	take	any	
further	steps	to	bring	it	about.
26	 Moldova’s	new	national	anthem	was	a	poem	called	‘Limba	noastra’	(Our	language),	written	
by	Alexander	Mateevici,	a	Bessarabian	Romanian.	The	poem	is	written	in	the	Romanian	
language,	but	the	actual	name	of	the	language	is	never	mentioned	in	its	content.
27	 The	development	of	Moldovan-Romanian	relations	over	the	last	two	decades	has	also	been	
broadly	described	in	O.	Milevschi,	Romania:	From	Brotherly	Affection	with	Moldova	to	Dis-
illusionment	and	Pragmatism,	in	Moldova:	Arena	of	International	Influences,	ed.	M.	Ko-
sienkowski,	W.	Schreiber,	Plymouth:	Lexington	Books,	p.	159.
28	 The	negotiations	lasted	so	long	mainly	because	of	a	lack	of	agreement	between	the	parties	
on	the	final	 forms	for	recording	the	historical	and	cultural	 foundations	of	bilateral	rela-
tions	(including	the	recognition	of	a	Moldovan	nation,	as	distinct	from	the	Romanian).
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mutual	support	for	their	efforts	aimed	at	integration	into	European	structures,	
and	based	on	the	involvement	of	Romania	in	the	active	support	of	all	actions	taken	
by	Moldova	to	preserve	its	unity	and	integrity	as	a	state.	One	result	of	the	devel-
opment	of	the	countries’	mutual	relations	was	the	creation	of	two	Euroregions,	
‘Lower	Danube’	and	‘Upper	Prut’	(in	1998	and	2000	respectively).
However,	this	positive	period	in	bilateral	relations	ended	relatively	quickly.	The	
rise	to	power	of	the	Party	of	Communists	of	the	Republic	of	Moldova	(PCRM)	in	
April	2001	marked	the	beginning	of	another	radical	change	in	relations	between	
Chișinau	and	Bucharest.	The	PCRM	went	to	the	polls	proclaiming	an	idea	of	
‘Moldovenism’	derived	from	the	Soviet	era.	The	promotion	of	this	idea	guar-
anteed	the	Communists	support,	not	only	from	the	many	pro-independence	
or	Sovietised	Moldovans,	who	had	had	the	Soviet	version	of	history	instilled	
into	them	at	school,	but	also	the	Russian-speaking	minorities	living	in	Moldova	
(Russians,	Ukrainians,	Gagauz,	Bulgarians).	This	happened	for	two	reasons.	
Firstly,	Moldovenism	legitimised	the	Moldovan	state’s	right	to	independence	
and	deemed	groundless	any	discussions	about	the	possibility	of	unifying	Mol-
dova	and	Romania,	which	the	Russian-speaking	residents	of	the	country	and	
the	anti-Romanian	ethnic	Moldovans	feared.	This	idea	also	created	the	concept	
of	a	Moldovan	nation,	the	existence	of	which	Romania	had	traditionally	denied,	
considering	all	ethnic	Moldovans	as	just	members	of	the	Romanian	people.	Sec-
ondly,	Moldovenism	presented	Moldova	as	a	country	which	had	long	been	multi-
ethnic,	multilingual,	tolerant	towards	other	religions	and	open	to	all	minorities.	
In	this	perspective,	the	Communists	contrasted	Moldovenism	with	Romanian	
nationalism,	which	from	their	perspective	was	chauvinist	and	intolerant.	At	
the	same	time	the	Communists	openly	promoted	rapprochement	with	Russia	
(including	eventual	accession	to	the	Union	State	of	Belarus	and	Russia),	and	
closer	cooperation	with	the	countries	of	the	former	Soviet	Union.
The	Communists’	ideological	attitude	was	perceived	very	coolly	in	Romania	
from	the	beginning.	Moldovenism	stands	in	contradiction	with	the	Romanian	
national	idea,	and	has	traditionally	been	profoundly	criticised	as	a	product	of	
Soviet	national-historical	engineering,	designed	to	justify	Russia’s	claim	to	the	
territory	of	present-day	Moldova.	Rapprochement	with	Russia	and	the	declared	
limiting	of	Chișinau’s	cooperation	with	the	EU	also	conflicted	with	Bucharest’s	
interests.	After	the	parliamentary	elections	of	26	November	2000	returned	the	
Social	Democratic	Party	(PSD)	to	power,	Romania	remained	strongly	pro-West-
ern	in	its	orientation,	putting	integration	with	NATO	and	the	EU	at	the	heart	
of	its	foreign	policy	–	in	stark	contrast	to	Moldova’s	turn	eastwards.	The	two	
countries’	differences	in	views	on	questions	of	identity	and	their	geopolitical	
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courses	posed	a	very	real	danger	of	exacerbating	tensions.	For	pragmatic	rea-
sons,	the	Communists	managed	to	avoid	raising	sensitive	issues	in	bilateral	rela-
tions	during	their	first	few	months	of	rule29,	but	in	July	2001	Chișinau’s	adoption	
of	new	regulations	elevating	the	status	of	the	Russian	language	provoked	the	
first	conflicts.
In	the	following	months,	bilateral	relations	were	also	affected	by	the	matter	of	
the	operation	in	Moldova	of	the	Bessarabian	Metropolitanate30,	which	is	subject	
to	the	Bucharest	patriarchy;	as	well	as	the	problem	of	the	Treaty	on	Partnership	
and	Cooperation,	whose	signing	(despite	having	been	initialled	in	2000)	Romania	
consistently	refused.	Over	the	next	months,	Chișinau	and	Bucharest	repeatedly	
blamed	each	other,	which	led	to	a	freeze	in	bilateral	relations.
The	situation	changed	in	November	2003,	together	with	Chișinau’s	withdrawal	
from	the	agreement	with	Transnistria	which	Moscow	had	forced	upon	it	(the	so-
called	Kozak	memorandum31),	as	a	result	of	which	Moldovan-Russian	relations	
deteriorated	dramatically.	Deprived	of	Russian	political	and	financial	support,	
the	PCRM	was	forced	to	make	a	pro-Western	turn,	at	least	at	the	level	of	its	public	
rhetoric.	The	government	in	Chișinau	also	began	to	try	and	improve	relations	
with	Romania.	From	the	Communists’	perspective,	their	pro-Western	turn	in	the	
situation	of	losing	Moscow’s	support	was	particularly	important	in	the	context	
29	 During	President	Vladimir	Voronin’s	first	 official	 visit	 to	Bucharest	 in	May	2001,	he	 an-
nounced	 a	 “new	pragmatic	 approach”	 to	Romanian-Moldovan	 relations.	The	declaration	
was	met	with	a	warm	welcome	from	the	President	of	Romania	Ion	Iliescu,	who	said:	“We	
would	like	to	leave	aside	political	and	ideological	differences	and	maintain	a	pragmatic	ap-
proach	to	relations	between	Moldova	and	Romania,	which	will	not	deteriorate	 in	the	fu-
ture.”	(Evolutia	politicii	externe	a	republicii	Moldova	(1998–2008),	http://www.fes-moldo-
va.org/media/publications/2010/Evolutia%20politicii%20externe%20a%20Republicii%20
Moldova%20%281998-2008%29.pdf,	p.	 15.)	After	his	 return	 to	Chișinau,	Voronin	publicly	
stressed	 the	priority	 of	Moldova’s	 relations	with	Romania,	 and	boasted	 that	he	had	 suc-
ceeded	in	establishing	friendly	relations	with	President	Iliescu.
30	 For	more	see	Chapter	II.3,	in	the	section	devoted	to	the	problem	of	the	Bessarabian	Metro-
politan	in	Moldova.
31	 The	Kozak	Memorandum	 of	 2003	 provided	 for	 the	 solution	 of	 the	 Transnistria	 problem	
through	the	creation	of	an	 ‘asymmetric	federation’	of	Moldova	and	Transnistria.	The	re-
alisation	of	this	scenario	maximised	the	influence	of	Transnistria	in	federal	government	
policies,	and	minimised	the	impact	of	the	federal	authorities	on	Transnistria,	while	main-
taining	the	presence	of	Russian	troops	in	the	region	as	a	guarantor	of	the	agreement.	This	
solution	would	have	changed	the	political	system	in	Moldova	in	favour	of	the	pro-Russian	
forces.	President	Voronin	initially	expressed	interest	in	implementing	the	memorandum.	
At	the	last	moment,	however,	he	withdrew	from	signing	the	agreement,	which	was	inter-
preted	as	a	serious	affront	in	the	Kremlin,	and	very	negatively	affected	the	Russian	authori-
ties’	confidence	in	the	Moldovan	Communists.
21
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 0
9/
20
15
of	the	parliamentary	elections	planned	for	2005.	The	pro-Russian	slogans	with	
which	the	party	had	won	power	in	2001	were	no	longer	effective,	and	the	change	
in	its	geopolitical	orientation	opened	up	an	opportunity	to	gain	Western	support.	
Both	the	Communists,	who	in	the	new	situation	were	counting	on	improved	rela-
tions	with	Romania,	and	Bucharest,	which	saw	a	chance	in	the	deterioration	of	
Moldovan-Russian	relations	for	a	new	opening	in	its	ties	with	Chișinau,	began	
clear	efforts	to	tone	down	the	hostile	rhetoric.
Moldova’s	new	policy	bore	fruit	in	2004,	when	(in	large	part	thanks	to	support	
from	Bucharest)	Chișinau	was	granted	observer	status	in	the	South-Eastern	
Europe	Cooperation	Process	(SEECP)32.	With	Romania’s	help,	Chișinau	also	man-
aged	to	sign	a	Pact	on	Stability	and	Security	with	Russia,	Ukraine,	Romania,	the	
OSCE,	the	US	and	the	EU.	Moldovan	cooperation	intensified	further	in	connec-
tion	with	its	2005	parliamentary	elections,	where	the	PCRM’s	main	subject	was	
European	integration.	The	President	of	Romania,	Traian	Băsescu,	newly	elected	
that	year,	openly	supported	both	the	pro-European	aspirations	of	Chișinau	as	
well	as	President	Vladimir	Voronin	himself.
However,	Romanian-Moldovan	relations	began	to	deteriorate	once	again	 in	
2006.	One	key	to	the	renewed	dispute	was	Romania’s	desire	to	increase	the	
role	it	was	playing	in	the	process	of	Moldova’s	European	integration,	as	well	as	
the	still	unresolved	problem	of	the	basic	and	border	treaty.	The	turning	point	
and	catalyst	for	the	negative	change	in	bilateral	relations	was	the	offer	Presi-
dent	Băsescu	made	to	Moldova	in	2006;	he	proposed	to	Chișinau	that	Moldova	
should	unite	with	Romania	before	its	entry	into	the	EU,	and	become	a	member	
of	the	Community	with	it	in	2007.	Although	from	the	beginning	the	Romanian	
President’s	idea	had	no	chance	of	being	implemented,	and	was	a	rhetorical	trick	
rather	than	a	call	for	real	action,	it	still	provoked	a	strong	reaction	from	the	
Moldovan	government.	In	response	to	Bucharest’s	proposal,	Voronin	promptly	
answered	that	Moldova	would	never,	even	after	joining	the	EU,	opt		for	unifica-
tion	with	Romania33.
These	two	statements	launched	a	second	series	of	mutual	accusations	in	five	
years,	which	in	turn	has	led	to	the	subsequent	prolonged	crisis	in	relations	
between	 Bucharest	 and	 Chișinau.	 Tensions	 reached	 their	 peak	 after	 the	
32	 The	South-East	European	Cooperation	Process	(SEECP)	was	launched	in	Sofia	in	1996.	It	aims	
to	strengthen	security	in	the	region,	develop	economic	relations	and	promote	democracy.
33	 http://www.9am.ro/stiri-revista-presei/Politica/38114/Presedintele-Voronin-respinge-
unirea-cu-Romania.html
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parliamentary	elections	in	April	2009,	when	President	Voronin	openly	accused	
Romania	of	inspiring	and	co-organising	the	riots	which	took	place	in	Chișinau	
after	the	announcement	of	the	voting	results34.	The	Romanian	Ambassador	Filip	
Teodorescu	was	declared	persona non grata	and	forced	to	leave	Moldova	within	
24	hours.	At	the	same	time	the	authorities	in	Chișinau	decided	to	introduce	visa	
requirements	for	Romanians,	and	temporarily	closed	the	border.	The	move-
ment	of	trains	between	the	two	countries	was	significantly	reduced	(officially	
for	technical	reasons).	These	tensions	lasted	a	relatively	short	time.	Due	to	the	
lack	of	consensus	in	Moldova’s	parliament	on	choosing	a	candidate	for	president,	
early	parliamentary	elections	were	held	in	July	2009.	As	a	result,	a	coalition	
of	four	pro-European	parties	came	to	power,	and	this	government	has	opened	
a	new	chapter	in	Romanian-Moldovan	relations.
Bilateral	relations	intensified	notably	almost	immediately	after	the	formation	of	
the	pro-European	government	in	Chișinau.	Bucharest	decided	to	take	advantage	
of	the	new	government’s	EU	aspirations,	and	take	over	as	the	main	advocate	
of	Moldova’s	European	integration	process.	On	the	one	hand,	it	would	provide	
a	platform	for	cooperation	and	allow	the	building	of	friendly	bilateral	relations,	
and	on	the	other	Romania	would	thus	bolster	its	own	position	within	the	EU.	In	
January	2010,	at	the	initiative	of	Bucharest	and	with	the	participation	of	France,	
a	so-called	Group	of	Friends	of	Moldova	was	founded.	Romanian	politicians	
also	began	to	speak	out	in	Moldova’s	interests	in	the	European	Parliament.	At	
the	same	time	there	has	been	a	clear	revival	of	political	contacts.	Representa-
tives	of	the	Romanian	government	arrived	in	Chișinau	almost	every	month.	The	
climate	was	also	made	more	conducive	by	the	rise	to	Moldova’s	presidency	of	
Mihai	Ghimpu,	the	leader	of	the	Liberal	Party	and	a	confirmed	‘Romanophile’,	in	
August	2009.	In	addition,	in	April	2010,	Presidents	Băsescu	and	Ghimpu	signed	
a	declaration	on	strategic	cooperation	in	which	Bucharest	undertook	to	help	
Moldova	in	its	efforts	on	the	road	to	European	integration35.	Romania	has	also	
committed	to	providing	Moldova	with	an	EU	acquis communautaire	translated	
into	Romanian,	which	made	talks	on	signing	an	Association	Agreement	with	
the	EU	much	easier	over	the	following	years.	Attempts	were	also	begun	at	re-
solving	the	problems	in	bilateral	relations	which	had	dated	back	many	years.	
In	2010	a	‘border	regime’	treaty	was	signed;	this	was	a	compromise,	but	in	the	
34	 Many	of	the	protesters,	who	numbered	tens	of	thousands,	gathered	at	the	seat	of	govern-
ment	and	the	parliament	building,	carried	Romanian	flags	and	shouted	pro-European	and	
pro-Romanian	slogans.	At	one	point,	several	demonstrators	also	managed	to	hoist	the	Ro-
manian	flag	on	the	top	of	the	president’s	official	building.
35	 http://www.mfa.gov.md/img/docs/0001739.pdf
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long	run	it	proved	unsatisfactory	to	Chișinau	(as	it	lacked	precise	definitions	of	
a	historical	and	cultural	nature),	addressing	the	failure	to	agree	on	a	basic	and	
border	treaty36.	In	the	same	year,	the	two	countries	also	signed	an	agreement	
on	small	border	traffic,	and	decided	to	open	two	Romanian	consulates	(in	Bălți	
and	Cahul),	which	Romania	had	been	trying	unsuccessfully	to	achieve	for	years.	
Another	important	gesture	was	the	decision	to	start	removing	the	barbed	wire	
and	fortifications	on	the	Moldovan	side	of	the	border	area	that	had	been	left	
over	from	the	Soviet	Union.
From	the	perspective	of	Chișinau,	which	has	worked	for	European	integration	
since	2009,	Romania	has	become	an	important	partner	in	facilitating	contacts	
with	the	West,	as	well	as	being	a	source	of	technical	assistance	(in	matters	of	
integration)	and	the	necessary	know-how.	For	this	reason,	the	Moldovan	gov-
ernment	is	interested	in	silencing	and	minimising	any	tensions	with	its	western	
neighbour.	This	does	not	mean,	however,	that	the	causes	for	these	tensions	have	
been	eliminated.
36	 http://www.mae.ro/en/node/5879
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II. FacTors aFFecTIng BIlaTeral relaTIons
1. The question of identity and language
The	question	of	identity	is	perhaps	the	most	sensitive	issue	in	the	bilateral	rela-
tions	between	Moldova	and	Romania,	and	continually	influences	the	relation-
ship	between	the	two	countries.
According	to	the	2004	census.	76%	of	the	population	of	Moldova	declared	they	
were	ethnic	Moldovans,	while	only	about	2-3%37	consider	themselves	to	be	Ro-
manians38.	To	a	greater	or	lesser	extent,	they	recognise	the	historical,	cultural,	
and	genetic	relationships	of	their	nation	with	Romania,	but	nevertheless	they	
emphasise	that	they	constitute	a	separate	national	group	which	has	its	own	his-
tory	and	culture	distinct	from	Romania’s.	This	view	is	primarily	the	result	of	
the	long	process	of	Moldavianisation	conducted	by	the	Soviet	authorities	during	
the	MSSR	period,	as	well	as	the	exclusion	of	the	people	living	on	the	territory	of	
modern	Moldova	from	the	nation-shaping	processes	of	the	modern	Romanian	
nation	which	had	been	taking	place	since	the	mid-nineteenth	century.	Neither	
the	government	in	Bucharest	nor	the	Romanian	scientific	community	believe	
in	the	existence	of	a	separate	Moldovan	nationality;	they	are	of	the	opinion	that	
Moldova	is	‘the	second	Romanian	state’	inhabited	principally	by	Romanians,	
and	they	consider	the	very	concept	of	a	‘Moldovan	nation’	to	be	nothing	more	
than	the	result	of	the	ethnic	engineering	conducted	by	the	USSR.	Romania	also	
opposes	the	concept	of	a	‘Moldovan	language’,	distinct	from	the	Romanian,	in	
the	Moldovan	legal	system	(primarily	the	constitution).
This	difference	of	views	between	Bucharest	and	Chișinau	on	the	problem	of	
a	separate	national	identity	for	the	Moldovans	causes	systematic	problems	in	
bilateral	relations.	One	example	of	this	is	the	freezing	of	relations	between	
Chișinau	and	Bucharest	in	2001.	On	19	July	that	year,	the	Parliament	of	Mol-
dova	adopted	a	law	‘On	the	rights	of	persons	belonging	to	national	minorities	
and	the	legal	status	of	their	organisations’,	which	gave	special	importance	to	
the	Russian	language.	Under	the	new	law,	Russian	became	a	de facto	privileged	
37	 These	figures	should	be	treated	with	caution.	There	are	many	reasons	to	believe	that	the	
census	results	were	manipulated	according	to	the	demands	of	the	ruling	Communist	Party,	
which	wanted	to	show	the	overwhelming	predominance	of	the	Moldovan	identity	over	the	
Romanian.	It	must	therefore	be	assumed	that	the	number	of	people	declaring	themselves	as	
‘Romanians’	is	actually	higher,	although	unlikely	to	exceed	10%.
38	 Another	census	was	held	in	2014,	but	its	results	have	still	not	been	published.
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language,	almost	equal	in	status	to	the	Moldovan	language.	All	acts	of	national	
importance	were	to	be	published	in	both	Moldovan	and	Russian,	and	citizens	
were	given	the	right	to	approach	state	institutions	and	receive	replies	from	
them	in	Russian.	Romania	responded	aggressively,	not	only	to	the	rise	in	the	
role	of	the	Russian	language	in	Moldova	as	highlighting	the	eastern	turn	of	
Chișinau’s	policy,	but	also	on	the	official	use	of	the	term	‘Moldovan	language’	in	
the	act.	Even	during	the	discussion	on	the	form	of	the	new	document,	President	
Iliescu	publicly	acknowledged	that	the	claim	that	Moldovan	was	supposedly	
distinct	from	Romanian	was	an	instrument	for	‘denationalising’	the	Romani-
ans	living	in	Moldova.	At	the	same	time	Adrian	Năstase,	the	Romanian	Prime	
Minister,	expressed	his	concerns	at	the	Moldovan	parliament’s	decisions.	Both	
speeches	ended	the	period	of	‘pragmatism’	in	relations	between	Chișinau	and	
Bucharest	which	had	been	observed	since	the	Communists	came	to	power	in	
April	2001,	and	initiated	an	intensive	exchange	of	mutual	accusations.	Just	two	
days	after	the	president	and	prime	minister’s	declarations,	the	speaker	of	the	
Moldovan	parliament	said	that	Romanians	constituted	a	national	minority	in	
Moldova,	just	like	the	Russians	or	Ukrainians.	This	statement	was	received	in	
Bucharest	as	a	serious	affront.	The	deterioration	of	relations	was	also	influenced	
by	a	freeze	in	the	dialogue	on	the	basic	and	border	treaty.	As	early	as	September	
Năstase	had	stated	that	although	relations	between	Moldova	and	Romania	still	
retained	their	special	character,	he	stressed	at	the	same	time	that	they	had	un-
dergone	“some	changes”	since	the	PCRM	came	to	power	in	Chișinau.	Once	again	
he	stressed	Romania’s	tough	stance	regarding	the	naming	of	the	language.	He	
also	made	his	planned	visit	to	the	Moldovan	capital	that	October	conditional	on	
progress	being	made	in	implementing	the	economic	projects	which	had	been	
agreed	on	earlier.
Due	to	Bucharest’s	refusal	to	recognise	Moldovans	as	a	separate	nation,	it	has	
systematically	denied	their	right	to	register	a	Moldovan	minority	in	Romania39.	
Censuses	held	in	Romania	also	do	not	take	the	existence	of	a	separate	Moldovan	
nationality	into	account,	and	treat	all	Moldovans	living	in	the	country	as	Ro-
manians,	even	if	they	have	Moldovan	citizenship.	Moldovan	minorities	living	
beyond	the	borders	of	Romania,	for	example	in	Ukraine,	are	also	unrecognised	
by	Bucharest	(despite	the	fact	that	Ukraine	recognises	the	existence	of	separate	
39	 This	position	sometimes	meets	with	peculiar	reactions	from	the	Moldovan	authorities.	One	
example	is	Vladimir	Voronin’s	statement	in	February	2007	in	which	he	stated	that	because	
Bucharest	does	not	recognise	the	existence	of	the	Moldovan	nationality,	about	10	million	
Moldovans	living	in	Romania	cannot	obtain	the	status	of	a	national	minority.	See	http://
www.bbc.co.uk/romanian/news/story/2007/02/070224_voronin_moldoveni.shtml
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Romanian	and	Moldovan	minorities	on	its	territory).	On	the	other	hand,	Mol-
dova	recognises	the	existence	of	a	Romanian	minority	on	its	territory,	which	
has	met	with	a	negative	reaction	from	Bucharest.
The	identity	problem	largely	lost	its	importance	in	shaping	Romanian-Moldo-
van	relations	after	the	pro-European	Alliance	for	European	Integration	coali-
tion	came	to	power	in	2009.	The	leaders	of	two	of	the	three	parties	forming	the	
coalition	at	that	time	(the	Liberal-Democratic	Party	and	the	Liberal	Party40)	
declared	the	proximity,	or	even	the	identity,	of	the	peoples	of	Romania	and	Mol-
dova,	as	well	as	officially	admitting	that	they	speak	Romanian41.	In	addition,	in	
2013	the	Constitutional	Court’s	judgement	that	the	Declaration	of	Independence,	
which	states	that	Romanian	is	Moldova’s	official	language,	took	priority	over	the	
Constitution,	according	to	which	the	language	is	Moldovan42.	At	the	same	time,	
60%	of	Moldovans	still	use	the	term	‘Moldovan	language’	to	describe	the	state	
language,	while	37%	believe	that	its	correct	name	is	‘the	Romanian	language’43.
Despite	the	identity	issue’s	temporary	disappearance	from	the	agenda	of	Moldo-
van-Romanian	relations,	it	must	be	stated	that	the	discussion	on	the	form	of	the	
Moldovan	identity	and	its	relationship	with	the	Romanian	identity	is	constantly	
present	in	Moldovan	domestic	politics,	even	under	the	current	ruling	coalition.	
Despite	its	pro-European	orientation,	the	Democratic	Party	(PDM),	the	second-
largest	party	in	the	coalition,	supports	the	‘Moldovanist’	idea,	emphasising	the	
Moldovans’	linguistic	and	cultural	distinctiveness	and	the	special	role	of	the	
Russian	language	in	the	history	of	Moldova,	and	also	defends	the	rights	of	the	
country’s	Russian-speaking	inhabitants.	There	is	no	doubt	that	Romania	will	
remain	the	essential	point	of	reference	in	the	constantly	ongoing	process	of	
Moldova	forming	a	stable	identity	for	itself.
40	 The	 ruling	 coalition	 in	Moldova	 collapsed	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 political	 crisis	which	 began	
in	January	2013.	In	May	2013	a	new	government	was	appointed,	including	the	two	parties	
which	had	formed	the	previous	coalition	(the	Moldovan	Liberal	Democratic	Party	and	the	
Democratic	Party),	as	well	as	the	Liberal	Party	of	Reformers,	made	up	of	some	Liberal	Party	
members.	This	party	had	the	same	attitude	to	the	issue	of	identity	in	Moldova	as	the	Liberal	
Party.
41	 http://unimedia.info/stiri/premierul-leanca-si-presedintele-timofti--la-unison-denu-
mirea-limbii-de-stat-trebuie-modificata-68185.html
42	 See	Kamil	Całus,	Mołdawski	Sąd	Konstytucyjny	uznał	język	rumuński	za	państwowy	[Mol-
dova’s	Constitutional	Court	 designates	Romanian	 as	 the	 state	 language],	OSW Analizy,	 11	
December	 2013:	 http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2013-12-11/moldawski-sad-
konstytucyjny-uznal-jezyk-rumunski-za-panstwowy
43	 http://unimedia.info/stiri/romana-sau-moldoveneasca-ce-spun-sondajele-75541.html
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2. The problem of granting romanian citizenship
The	Romanian	policy	facilitating	Romanian	citizenship	for	Moldovans	is	prob-
ably	one	of	the	strongest	tools	for	building	Romania’s	‘soft	power’	in	Moldova	
since	that	country	became	independent.
In	1991,	the	parliament	in	Bucharest	adopted	new	regulations	on	the	acquisition	
of	Romanian	citizenship.	These	stated	that	former	nationals	of	that	country	
who	had	lost	their	citizenship	against	their	will	would	have	the	opportunity	to	
regain	it,	without	having	to	surrender	their	citizenship	or	moving	to	Romania.	
This	law	was	directed	particularly	at	the	inhabitants	of	those	territories	which	
belonged	to	Romania	before	1940,	i.e.	Moldova	(without	Transnistria),	as	well	
as	northern	Bukovina	and	Bugeac,	which	are	currently	located	within	Ukraine.	
The	right	to	acquire	citizenship	under	the	Law	also	applies	to	the	descendants	
of	these	people.	From	the	perspective	of	the	Romanian	government,	this	act	
was	intended	to	fix	the	‘historic	injustice’	that	was	the	forced	deprivation	by	the	
USSR	of	Romanian	citizenship	from	the	residents	of	Bessarabia.	However,	in	the	
1990s	Romanian	citizenship	did	not	enjoy	great	popularity	among	Moldovans,	
as	in	practice	the	Romanian	passport	did	not	bring	any	tangible	benefits	with	
it.	Besides	having	some	sentimental	value	for	the	small	part	of	the	population	
of	Moldova	who	see	it	as	their	homeland,	Romania	was	not	inviting	in	economic	
terms.	As	a	result,	only	about	100,000	people	had	applied	for	Romanian	citizen-
ship	by	the	end	of	the	decade44.
Interest	in	the	Romanian	passport	increased	dramatically	after	the	EU’s	aboli-
tion	in	2001	of	visa	requirements	for	Romanian	citizens	to	travel	in	the	Schen-
gen	area.	In	just	six	months,	the	Romanian	authorities	received	almost	19,000	
applications	from	residents	of	Moldova	for	the	restoration	of	citizenship.	Very	
soon,	the	Romanian	authorities	were	forced	to	tighten	up	the	rules,	both	due	
to	insufficient	administrative	resources	to	process	the	applications,	as	well	as	
in	the	light	of	criticism	of	Bucharest	from	the	EU.	Among	other	measures,	the	
Romanian	authorities	began	to	require	that	documents	be	submitted	to	the	
Ministry	of	Justice	in	Bucharest,	and	not	at	any	consular	branch	as	had	hith-
erto	been	the	case.	In	addition,	new	citizens	would	not	be	able	to	benefit	from	
privileges	such	as	the	right	to	travel	visa-free	to	the	Schengen	area	for	a	period	
of	four	years.	The	new	regulations	almost	completely	stopped	the	applications	
44	 A.	Cioroianu,	Reacquiring	the	Romanian	Citizenship,	Bucharest	2012,	p.	360.
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to	restore	citizenship45.	The	situation	changed	again	after	amendments	to	the	
law	on	citizenship	introduced	by	the	parliament	in	2007-2008.	Bureaucratic	
procedures	were	improved,	and	a	new	institution	in	the	state	administration	
was	created	responsible	for	processing	applications	for	citizenship,	the	National	
Administration	for	Citizenship,	which	accelerated	the	process	of	naturalisation.	
At	the	same	time,	Romania’s	accession	to	the	EU	in	2007	significantly	increased	
its	own	attractiveness46.	The	procedures	for	issuing	citizenship	were	further	
relaxed	in	reaction	to	the	anti-Communist	demonstrations	which	took	place	
in	Chișinau	after	the	parliamentary	elections	in	April	200947.	As	a	result,	by	
2013	the	number	of	Moldovans	with	Romanian	passports	had	risen	to	about	
400,000-500,00048.
The	issue	of	granting	Romanian	citizenship	must	be	considered	in	the	context	of	
the	official	relations	between	Bucharest	and	Chișinau.	The	provisions	concern-
ing	allowing	Moldovan	citizens	to	acquire	Romanian	citizenship	under	a	simpli-
fied	procedure	in	the	1990s	and	the	first	half	of	the	2000s	did	not	arouse	much	
reaction	from	the	authorities	in	Chișinau,	primarily	due	to	the	relatively	small	
scale	of	this	phenomenon,	and	the	countries’	correct	bilateral	relations	at	that	
time.	However,	the	situation	changed	after	the	modifications	and	amendments	
made	to	the	law	on	citizenship	in	2007.	The	office	of	President	Vladimir	Voronin	
in	Chișinau	called	Bucharest’s	policy	a	threat	to	Moldovan	statehood49,	and	in	
October	2007	the	Communist-dominated	parliament	passed	a	law	banning	pub-
lic	office	holders	from	holding	any	other	citizenship	than	Moldovan.	Chișinau’s	
criticism	of	Romanian	citizenship	policies	dried	up	relatively	quickly,	however,	
as	it	had	no	support	from	the	electorate.	The	possibility	of	obtaining	a	Romanian	
passport,	especially	after	Romania	joined	the	EU,	met	with	interest	from	a	sig-
nificant	part	of	Moldovan	society	(according	to	Traian	Băsescu,	over	a	million	
Moldovans	applied	for	the	restoration	of	citizenship50).
45	 The	number	of	Moldovans	who	were	granted	Romanian	citizenship	in	the	years	2001-2007	
amounted	to	barely	3000.
46	 Undoubtedly,	interest	in	Romanian	citizenship	was	raised	by	the	introduction	on	1	Novem-
ber	2006	of	visa	requirements	for	citizens	of	Moldova.
47	 http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-esential-5598907-guvernul-simplifica-procedurile-ob-
tinere-cetateniei-romane-moldovenii-pot-obtine-cetatenia-daca-strabunic-roman.htm
48	 This	number	comes	from	a	study	conducted	by	the	Soros	Foundation	in	2013.	http://www.
fundatia.ro/o-politic%C4%83-ce-cap%C4%83t%C4%83-viziune-redob%C3%A2ndirea-
cet%C4%83%C8%9Beniei-rom%C3%A2ne-0
49	 http://www.realitatea.net/voronin-acuza-romania-ca-pune-in-pericol-statalitatea-re-
publicii-moldova_110217.html
50	 http://www.realitatea.net/un-sfert-de-milion-de-moldoveni-au-primit-cetatenia-roma-
na_935694.html
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After	the	Alliance	for	European	Integration	coalition	came	to	power	in	2009,	
the	issue	of	citizenship	completely	disappeared	from	the	catalogue	of	bilateral	
problems.	Prime	Minister	Vlad	Filat	officially	declared	that	both	from	a	legal	
perspective,	as	well	as	in	his	personal	opinion,	Moldovans	have	the	right	to	
have	multiple	citizenships51.	The	possibility	of	Moldovans	obtaining	Romanian	
passports	is	a	method	for	the	government	in	Chișinau	to	alleviate	social	tensions	
by	increasing	the	mobility	of	its	citizens,	which	is	particularly	important	for	mi-
grant	workers.	It	also	allows	an	increase	in	cash	flow	to	the	Moldovan	economy	
through	an	increase	in	remittances	from	people	working	abroad.
The	question	of	granting	citizenship	to	Moldovan	citizens	should	also	be	seen	as	
a	very	effective	instrument	for	ensuring	political	popularity	in	Romania	itself.	
Promoting	the	liberalisation	of	the	law	on	citizenship	is	one	way	for	Romanian	
politicians	to	position	themselves	as	patriots	who	care	about	the	fate	of	compa-
triots	abroad,	a	stance	which	traditionally	wins	the	sympathy	of	the	electorate	
and	ensures	a	rise	in	political	popularity.	At	the	same	time,	this	approach	does	
not	generate	any	visible	costs	to	the	Romanian	state,	as	the	new	citizens	do	not	
usually	settle	in	Romania,	nor	do	they	seek	work	there,	which	could	lead	to	
growing	resentment	among	the	Romanian	population.	In	addition,	the	new	citi-
zens	are	also	willing	to	vote	for	policies	promoting	an	easier	process	of	gaining	
citizenship.	It	seems	likely	that	one	of	the	reasons	why	Traian	Băsescu	insisted	
on	modifying	the	legislation	in	2007	was	the	hope	of	obtaining	additional	votes	
from	naturalised	Moldovans.	In	the	presidential	elections	in	2009	Băsescu	won	
the	second	round	by	a	very	small	margin	(71,000);	the	overwhelming	majority	
of	voters	abroad	–	and	thus,	largely	Moldovans	with	Romanian	passports	–	sup-
ported	his	candidacy.
Considering	this	large	group	of	Moldovans	with	Romanian	passports,	Roma-
nian	politicians	have	made	a	habit	of	including	Moldova	in	their	election	cam-
paigns	over	the	last	few	years.	In	2012,	before	the	referendum	to	dismiss	Tra-
ian	Băsescu	from	the	post	of	President	of	Romania,	he	paid	an	official	visit	to	
Chișinau,	the	real	purpose	of	which	was	to	mobilise	the	local	electorate.	During	
the	elections	to	the	Parliament	of	Romania	in	2012,	Eugen	Tomac,	a	candidate	
from	the	list	of	the	Democratic	Liberal	Party,	also	opened	his	electoral	campaign	
in	Chișinau;	after	winning	and	taking	his	seat	as	a	deputy,	he	opened	the	first	
parliamentary	office	of	a	Romanian	deputy	in	the	Moldovan	capital	in	2013.
51	 Vlad	Filat	made	this	declaration	in	an	interview	with	Kamil	Całus	and	Piotr	Oleksy,	‘We	are	
not	afraid	of	 the	future’,	published	 in	the	quarterly	Nowa Europa Wschodnia	 [New Eastern 
Europe]	No.	5	(XIII)	2010.
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Although	the	EU	lifted	the	visa	requirement	for	those	Moldovan	citizens	who	
hold	biometric	passports	(for	travel	for	up	to	three	months)	in	April	2014,	this	
did	not	noticeably	reduce	Moldovans’	interest	in	the	possibility	of	receiving	
Romanian	citizenship.	Visa-free	travel	does	not	offer	the	possibility	of	obtaining	
legal	employment	in	the	EU,	which	the	Romanian	passport	does	allow52.
3. The problem of the Bessarabian metropolitanate
Since	the	first	years	of	Moldovan	independence,	the	issue	of	the	status	and	po-
sition	of	the	Bessarabian	Metropolitanate,	which	operates	in	Moldova	and	is	
subordinate	to	the	Romanian	Orthodox	Church,	has	posed	a	problem	to	the	
authorities	in	Chișinau	which,	over	time,	clearly	began	to	affect	Moldovan-
Romanian	relations	as	well.
Historically,	the	Orthodox	Church	in	what	is	now	Moldova	was	systematically	
subordinated	to	the	Moscow	Patriarchate	when	these	areas	were	joined	to	the	
Russian	Empire	in	1812.	By	mid-century	the	Moldavian	Orthodox	Church	had	
in	principle	undergone	total	Russification.	The	situation	was	changed	when	
the	current	areas	of	Moldova	(without	Transnistria)	joined	Romania	in	1918,	as	
a	result	of	which	the	Moldavian	Arch-Eparch	was	incorporated	into	the	Roma-
nian	Orthodox	Church.	This	state	continued	until	the	return	of	these	areas	to	
Moscow’s	control.	After	the	annexation	of	the	territory	of	today’s	Moldova	in	
1940,	the	Soviet	authorities	took	extensive	measures	to	eliminate	the	influence	
of	the	Romanian	Orthodox	Church,	and	forced	the	faithful	to	come	under	the	
jurisdiction	of	Moscow.	The	Bessarabian	Metropolitanate	was	relegated	to	the	
level	of	an	eparchy	and	incorporated	into	the	Russian	Orthodox	Church.	The	
new	unit	was	led	by	Ieronim	Zaharov,	a	Russian	priest	nominated	by	Moscow.	
The	assets	of	the	former	Bessarabian	Metropolitanate	were	nationalised,	de-
stroyed	or	transferred	to	the	Russian	Orthodox	Church.	Orthodox	priests	from	
the	Romanian	Church	were	exiled	or	murdered.	As	a	result,	in	just	a	few	years	
the	Soviet	authorities	managed	to	take	full	control	of	the	remaining	Moldovan	
church	structures.
In	the	wake	of	Gorbachev’s	 thaw,	the	Russian	Orthodox	Church	recovering	
its	freedom	of	action	proceeded	to	renew	its	influence	in	Moldova.	As	early	as	
September	1990,	two	months	after	Moldova’s	declaration	of	its	sovereignty,	the	
52	 See	Marta	 Jaroszewicz,	Kamil	Całus,	Moldova:	 a	year	 after	 the	 introduction	of	 the	visa-
free	 regime,	 OSW Analyses,	 6	 May	 2015:	 http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analy-
ses/2015-05-06/moldova-a-year-after-introduction-visa-free-regime
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Russian	Patriarch	Aleksei	II	created	the	new	diocese	of	Bălți	during	his	visit	
to	Chișinau,	and	appointed	the	Moldovan	Petru	Păduraru	its	bishop.	In	Janu-
ary	1991,	the	Holy	Synod	in	Moscow	decided	to	establish	a	Metropolitanate	of	
Chișinau	and	All-Moldova	(hereinafter	abbreviated	as	the	Moldovan	Metropoli-
tanate).	The	pro-Romanian	Moldovan	Popular	Front	then	ruling	in	Chișinau	
disapproved	of	the	Russian	Orthodox	Church’s	increasing	influence,	but	apart	
from	suspending	the	official	registration	of	the	new	Metropolitanate,	 it	did	
little	to	limit	the	Church’s	activity.	The	situation	changed	in	September	1992	
when	Bishop	Petru	was	officially	suspended	for	his	pro-Romanian	convictions,	
and	announced	the	creation	of	the	Autonomous	Bessarabian	Metropolitanate	
with	a	group	of	priests.	He	also	asked	the	Patriarch	of	the	Romanian	Ortho-
dox	Church,	Teoctist	I,	to	incorporate	the	self-proclaimed	Metropolitanate	into	
the	Romanian	Church	with	the	rank	of	diocese.	On	19	December	1992,	with-
out	consulting	Moscow,	Teoctist	decided	to	restore	the	Orthodox	Bessarabian	
Metropolitanate	in	the	Republic	of	Moldova.	The	interim	management	of	the	
Metropolitanate,	until	the	election	of	a	metropolitan	of	the	Romanian	Episcopal	
Church,	was	entrusted	to	Bishop	Petru	of	Bălți.
The	creation	of	an	Orthodox	Church	in	Moldova	subordinate	to	the	Romanian	
Patriarchate	was	very	well	received	in	Romania,	but	the	strengthening	Moldo-
van	elite	increasingly	openly	supported	the	Chișinau	Metropolitanate,	subordi-
nate	to	Moscow.	As	a	result,	although	in	1993	the	authorities	in	Chișinau	finally	
registered	the	Metropolitanate	of	Chișinau	and	All-Moldova	(established	in	
1991),	each	successive	attempt	to	register	the	Bessarabian	Metropolitanate	was	
turned	down.	This	conduct	by	the	Moldovan	authorities	was	primarily	politi-
cally	motivated.	Chișinau	wished	to	avoid	a	deterioration	of	its	relations	with	
Russia,	and	more	importantly,	to	ensure	the	support	of	the	Moldovan	elector-
ate,	86%	of	whom	belong	to	the	Moldovan	Metropolitanate53.	In	addition,	formal	
recognition	of	the	Bessarabian	Metropolitanate	would	have	enabled	the	latter	
to	request	the	restitution	of	property	seized	after	Bessarabia’s	annexation	to	
the	Soviet	Union,	which	the	Moldovan	Metropolitanate	also	intended	to	do.	The	
authorities	in	Chișinau	feared	that	a	clash	between	both	Orthodox	Churches	for	
influence	and	wealth	could	provoke	sectarian	tensions,	which	it	wanted	to	avoid	
at	all	costs,	especially	in	the	context	of	the	already	significant	ethnic	tensions	
within	the	republic.
53	 Source:	http://photos.state.gov/libraries/moldova/106281/PDF-RU/2011-IRF-RU.pdf	
The	Moldovan	Metropolitanate	is	much	larger	than	the	Bessarabian.	It	includes	some	1300	
parishes,	compared	to	the	figure	of	just	over	100	parishes	subordinated	to	the	latter.	Data	on	
Patriarch	Kirill’s	declaration	in	2013:	http://www.pravoslavie.ru/news/63936.htm
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Despite	the	entanglement	of	the	Patriarchates	of	Moscow	and	Bucharest	in	con-
flict	over	the	official	registration	of	the	Bessarabian	Metropolitanate	through-
out	the	1990s,	this	problem	effectively	remained	an	internal	Moldovan	matter,	
and	did	not	directly	affect	the	relationship	between	Chișinau	and	Bucharest.
The	situation	changed	radically	after	the	PCRM	came	to	power.	After	a	short	
period	of	maintaining	good	relations	with	Romania,	its	politicians	began	to	
exploit	the	problem	of	the	Bessarabian	Metropolitanate	in	order	to	shape	its	
policy	towards	Bucharest.	On	2	October	2001	Ion	Morei,	the	Moldovan	Minister	
of	Justice,	while	appearing	before	the	European	Court	of	Human	Rights	in	a	case	
concerning	the	official	registration	in	Moldova	of	the	Bessarabian	Metropoli-
tanate	Orthodox	Church,	described	its	activities	and	its	support	by	Bucharest	
as	a	manifestation	of	Romania’s	“expansionist	policy”	and	“an	attempt	to	influ-
ence	the	internal	affairs	of	the	sovereign	and	independent	Republic	of	Mol-
dova	through	the	use	of	pro-Romanian	forces	inside	the	country”54.	In	response,	
Prime	Minister	Năstase	called	on	Voronin	to	dismiss	Morei,	but	this	request	
was	rejected.	At	the	same	time	Năstase	announced	that	as	long	as	Chișinau	
failed	to	reply	formally	to	Morei’s	speech,	bilateral	relations	would	“have	to	
remain	subject	to	redefinition”55.	Chișinau	said	that	the	minister’s	statement	
had	been	personal	in	nature,	and	refused	to	make	the	official	apology	demanded	
by	Bucharest.	Năstase	finally	announced	that	despite	the	situation	Romania	
wanted	to	maintain	its	‘technical	cooperation’	with	Moldova.
Despite	Chișinau	recognising	the	Bessarabian	Metropolitanate	and	officially	
registering	it	in	2002,	the	question	continues	to	cause	problems	in	bilateral	rela-
tions.	The	conflict	between	the	Metropolitanates	once	again	took	on	a	political	
character	in	2007,	when	the	Synod	of	the	Romanian	Orthodox	Church	decided	
to	create	three	new	eparchies	in	right-bank	Moldova	and	Transnistria.	This	re-
ceived	an	angry	response	from	both	the	Chișinau	Metropolitanate	and	the	Mos-
cow	Patriarchate,	and	within	a	short	time	the	Moldovan	authorities	also	joined	
in	the	conflict.	President	Voronin	stated	that	the	Romanian	Orthodox	Church’s	
actions	are	part	of	the	constant	aggression	Bucharest	was	carrying	out	against	
Moldova;	he	made	another	similar	declaration	in	December	200756.	As	a	result	
of	the	escalation	of	the	dispute,	Chișinau	expelled	two	Romanian	diplomats	
54	 L.	Turcescu,	L.	Stan,	Church–state	conflict	in	Moldova:	the	Bessarabian	Metropolitanate,	in	
Communist and Post-Communist Studies	36	(2003),	p.	460.
55	 Conflict	between	Bucharest	and	Chisinau	shows	no	sign	of	 letting	off…,	http://www.hri.
org/news/balkans/rferl/2001/01-10-09.rferl.html
56	 http://www.europalibera.org/archive/news/20071209/445/445.html?id=1450870
33
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 0
9/
20
15
and	demanded	that	the	four	priests	of	the	Bessarabian	Metropolitanate	leave	
the	country.	The	dispute	ended	with	the	Patriarchate	of	Bucharest	withdraw-
ing	from	its	decision	to	open	the	new	eparchies,	and	a	radical	deterioration	of	
relations	between	Moldova	and	Romania.
Since	the	coalition	of	pro-European	parties	came	to	power	in	2009,	the	conflict	
between	the	Metropolitanates	no	longer	has	a	political	dimension	and	has	not	
affected	bilateral	relations.	It	should	be	assumed	that	if	pro-Russian	forces	and	
anti-Romanian	forces	take	power	again,	this	issue	will	once	more	become	an	
instrument	in	relations	between	Bucharest	and	Chișinau.
4. The issue of the basic and border treaty
Although	negotiations	have	been	ongoing	since	the	early	1990s,	Romania	has	
consistently	refused	to	sign	a	basic	document	with	Moldova	governing	the	two	
countries’	bilateral	relations	(namely	the	Agreement	on	Partnership	and	Co-
operation,	or	the	basic	and	border	treaty)57.	Moldova	has	called	for	Romania	to	
adopt	this	document,	as	doing	so	would	constitute	a	formal	recognition	of	the	
Moldovan-Romanian	border.	Meanwhile,	the	failure	to	sign	it	introduces	an	
element	of	uncertainty	to	bilateral	relations,	hampers	the	implementation	of	
reciprocal	agreements,	and	gives	a	very	strong	propaganda	argument	to	anti-
Romanian	political	forces	in	Moldova.	Bucharest’s	lack	of	political	will	to	sign	
such	a	document	allows	these	groups	to	argue,	with	some	justification,	that	the	
real	objective	of	Romanian	policy	is	in	fact	to	absorb	Moldova.	As	a	result,	this	
also	increases	social	tensions	inside	the	country,	because	the	lack	of	a	border	
treaty	enhances	the	fears	among	the	Russian-speaking	minority	and	the	pro-
independence	section	of	Moldovan	society	of	a	possible	merger	with	Romania.
The	authorities	in	Bucharest	are	not	interested	in	signing	a	treaty	with	Chișinau	
primarily	out	of	fear	of	the	reaction	of	their	own	electorate.	For	a	large	part	of	
Romanian	society,	such	a	step	would	be	seen	as	a	symbolic	sealing	of	the	loss	of	
the	Moldovan	lands,	and	the	formal	abandonment	of	any	hope	for	the	reunifica-
tion	of	the	two	countries.	In	addition,	the	vast	majority	of	Romanian	politicians	
have	stressed	that	signing	such	a	document	would	be	a	symbolic	acknowledg-
ment	of	the	Molotov-Ribbentrop	Pact.	At	the	same	time,	they	argue	that	such	
a	treaty	is	unnecessary	because	Romania	recognised	the	border	with	the	USSR	
57	 Bucharest	and	Chișinau	were	closest	to	reaching	an	agreement	in	2000,	when	the	Agree-
ment	on	Partnership	and	Cooperation	was	 initialled.	However,	 this	document	has	never	
been	signed	by	the	parties.
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in	1947,	under	the	Treaty	of	Paris,	and	signed	the	Final	Act	of	the	Conference	on	
Security	and	Cooperation	in	Europe	in	1975,	which	is	committed	to	the	territo-
rial	integrity	of	the	other	European	states.
An	additional	problem	hampering	the	signing	of	the	two	documents	is	the	pre-
viously	discussed	issue	of	language	and	identity.	The	Moldovan	authorities,	par-
ticularly	during	Communist	rule,	pushed	for	such	a	treaty	to	include	provisions	
on	the	distinct	difference	of	the	Moldovan	language,	highlighting	the	existence	
of	an	independent	Moldovan	nation.	The	version	of	the	treaty	proposed	by	the	
Communists	also	presented	a	different	narration	of	the	history	of	the	Moldovan	
lands	from	that	of	Romania.	The	Moldovan	position	met	strong	opposition	from	
Bucharest,	making	it	impossible	to	hold	constructive	dialogue	aimed	at	working	
out	a	compromise	agreement.	The	situation	has	not	changed	even	since	the	rise	
to	power	in	2009	of	pro-European	forces,	which	were	much	more	favourable	
to	Romania	and	more	willing	to	make	concessions	to	it.	Chișinau	did	agree	to	
separate	the	issue	of	local	border	traffic	from	the	basic	and	border	treaty,	and	as	
early	as	13	November	2009	Bucharest	signed	an	agreement	on	this	matter.	A	year	
later,	on	8	November	2010,	the	parties	signed	a	treaty	concerning	the	border	
regime,	which	defined	the	issues	concerning	the	management	and	control	of	
the	Moldovan-Romanian	border,	and	also	defined	the	framework	for	coopera-
tion	between	the	two	countries’	border	services.	Both	documents	are	of	a	purely	
technical	nature,	however,	and	cannot	be	seen	as	the	equivalent	of	a	full	border	
treaty.	Moreover,	Bucharest	only	agreed	to	the	signing	relatively	reluctantly,	
primarily	in	order	to	accelerate	Romania’s	joining	the	Schengen	area.	Despite	
signing	the	document,	it	has	not	yet	been	ratified	by	the	Romanian	Parliament58.
It	seems	that	the	government	in	Bucharest	will	not	decide	to	sign	the	basic	and	
border	treaty	with	Moldova	in	the	foreseeable	future,	for	fear	of	being	criti-
cised	by	the	political	opposition	and	its	own	electorate.	Chișinau’s	pressure	to	
solve	this	problem	is	too	weak,	just	like	the	pressure	from	the	Western	part-
ners.	There	is	no	doubt	that	the	absence	of	such	an	agreement	will	still	remain	
a	pretext	for	anti-European	and	anti-Romanian	propaganda	from	Moldova’s	
pro-Russian	circles,	and	for	Russia	itself.
58	 http://www.regnum.ru/news/polit/1714504.html
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III. The oBjecTIves and Tools oF romanIan polIcy 
Towards moldova
Romania’s	policy	objectives	towards	Moldova	remain	constant,	regardless	of	
the	changes	in	the	ruling	elites	in	Bucharest	and	Chișinau,	or	of	the	mutual	
relations	between	the	two	countries.
The	primary	objective	of	Romanian	policy	towards	Moldova	since	the	latter	
gained	independence	is	to	anchor	Chișinau	in	the	system	of	Western	institu-
tions	and	international	associations.	To	achieve	this	goal,	regardless	of	the	
state	of	bilateral	relations	at	any	given	time,	Bucharest	has	repeatedly	acted	
as	Moldova’s	advocate	in	its	efforts	to	join	the	OSCE,	the	Council	of	Europe	
and	the	WTO.	Bucharest	has	been	a	strong	supporter	of	Moldova	joining	the	
European	Union,	hence	its	unequivocal	support	for	all	the	prior	stages	of	Mol-
dova’s	move	towards	the	EU,	including	joining	the	CETA	and	the	Central	Eu-
ropean	Initiative.	Romania	also	supported	Moldova	signing	the	Association	
Agreement	as	soon	as	it	could,	as	well	as	the	agreement	on	the	Deep	and	Com-
prehensive	Free	Trade	Area	(DCFTA)	which	is	part	of	the	AA;	and	has	often	
lobbied	for	Moldova’s	inclusion	in	EU	regional	cooperation	formats	such	as	
the	Danube	Strategy.	Romania	was	the	main	initiator	and	founder	in	2009	of	
the	so-called	Group	of	Friends	of	Moldova	(a.k.a.	the	Group	for	the	European	
Action	of	Moldova)	in	the	EU.
At	the	same	time,	Romania	is	trying	to	prevent	any	attempts	to	deepen	Moldo-
van	integration	with	the	structures	promoted	by	Russia.	Moldova’s	ratification	
in	1994	of	the	Bielavezha	Accords	and	the	CIS	Statute	(and	therefore	its	formal	
agreement	to	join	this	organisation)	met	with	a	negative	reaction	from	Bucha-
rest.	Romania	has	also	denounced	the	idea	of		Moldova	joining	the	Customs	Un-
ion.	Although	Bucharest	officially	supports	Moldova’s	territorial	integrity,	in	
practice	the	possible	reunification	of	Moldova	and	Transnistria	does	not	lie	in	
Romania’s	interest.	Such	a	move	could	in	fact	lead	to	an	increase	in	Russian	in-
fluence	in	the	country,	and	would	undoubtedly	alter	its	social	structure	and	in-
crease	the	role	of	the	Russian-speaking	population	in	the	politics	of	Chișinau59.	
This	would	undoubtedly	affect	relations	between	Moldova	and	Romania.	To	
achieve	its	objective,	Bucharest	has	been	working	not	only	on	the	political	and	
diplomatic	levels,	but	is	also	seeking	to	increase	economic	ties	between	Romania	
59	 As	President	of	Romania,	Traian	Băsescu	spoke	on	the	secession	of	Transnistria	for	the	sake	
of	Moldova’s	European	integration	in	April	2015:	http://www.pan.md/news/Besesku-Mol-
dova-doljna-otkazatisya-ot-Pridnestroviya/54851
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and	Moldova.	This	is	intended	both	to	increase	Romania’s	importance	as	a	trad-
ing	partner	for	Moldova,	and	to	develop	the	transport	and	energy	infrastruc-
ture	between	the	two	countries.
Bucharest’s	actions	towards	Chișinau	are	also	focused	on	supporting	the	pro-
cesses	of	‘re-Romanianising’	Moldova,	which	should	be	seen	as	part	of	a	move	
to	build	up	Romanian	soft	power.	Romania	has	funded	6000	scholarships	for	
Moldovan	students	and	pupils;	it	provides	literature	in	Romanian	to	Moldova’s	
libraries,	and	supplies	school	with	history	textbooks	(written	by	Romanian	
historians,	which	also	allows	it	to	promote	the	Romanian	national	idea).	In	ad-
dition,	the	financing	of	scholarships	allows	Bucharest	to	attract	the	most	tal-
ented	Moldovan	students,	who	either	remain	in	Romania	or	(less	frequently)	
return	to	Moldova,	where	they	form	a	pro-Romanian	political,	administrative	
and	business	caste.	Romania	also	allocates	funds	for	development	assistance	
to	Moldova,	which	should	also	be	included	in	Romania’s	instruments	of	soft	
power.	The	largest	such	instrument	was	the	non-refundable	aid	programme	
launched	in	2010	at	the	initiative	of	the	President	of	Romania	Traian	Băsescu,	
which	amounted	to	€100	million60.
The	subject	of	Moldova	is	a	useful	tool	to	bolster	the	position	of	Romanian	
politicians.	The	issue	of	(political,	economic	and	social)	aid	for	Moldova	has	
for	years	been	one	of	the	arenas	of	dispute	between	the	long-time	President	
of	Romania	Traian	Băsescu	and	Prime	Minister	Victor	Ponta.	Both	politicians	
have	striven	to	outdo	each	other	in	their	achievements	in	this	field	over	the	
past	few	years61.	The	Romanian	presidential	elections	in	November	2014	were	
an	important	factor	in	mobilising	Victor	Ponta	to	increase	his	involvement	in	
Moldovan	matters.
Despite	the	existence	of	permanent	policy	objectives	towards	Chișinau,	the	lack	
of	a	viable	long-term	strategy	for	Romania’s	conduct	towards	Moldova	in	the	
political,	economic,	and	security	spheres	is	noteworthy.	The	previously	dis-
cussed	actions	Romania	has	undertaken	are	often	short-term	in	nature	(and	
some	remain	purely	declarative),	and	do	not	constitute	a	strategically	coherent	
60	 It	should	be	noted,	however,	that	despite	these	high-sounding	declarations,	as	of	now	(i.e.	
after	four	years	of	operation)	only	about	€40	million	of	the	promised	€100	million	has	been	
paid.	The	main	reason	for	the	delays	is	the	failure	to	develop	the	technical	side	of	imple-
menting	the	non-repayable	loan,	as	well	as	administrative	failures	on	the	part	of	Romania.
61	 For	example,	see	http://www.psd.ro/media/stiri/victor-ponta-pentru-republica-moldova-
eu-am-facut-traian-basescu-doar-a-spus/
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whole.	Moreover,	even	though	the	country	is	officially	a	priority	in	Bucharest’s	
foreign	policy,	it	should	be	noted	that	the	group	of	experts	who	could	support	
the	Government	in	developing	such	a	strategy	is	still	relatively	small.
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Iv. romanIa’s role In The polITIcs oF chIșInau
Moldova’s	policy	towards	Romania	has	both	an	external	dimension,	focused	on	the	
development	of	bilateral	relations	per se,	as	well	as	an	internal	dimension,	connected	
with	the	political	struggle	inside	the	country.	In	this	case,	the	role	of	Romania	in	
Moldovan	politics	is	–	in	contrast	to	the	Romanian	objectives	towards	Moldova	–	
much	more	variable,	and	depends	on	which	forces	currently	hold	power	in	Chișinau.
In	the	context	of	foreign	policy	as	seen	by	Chișinau,	Romania	is	a	crucial	coun-
terweight	to	Russian	influence.	Examples	of	this	include	the	pro-Romanian	
turn	which	the	Moldovan	communists	took	after	the	dramatic	deterioration	in	
relations	between	Moldova	and	Russia	in	2003.	Naturally	the	groups	pursuing	
European	integration,	which	took	power	in	2009	and	thus	had	to	work	to	reduce	
Russian	influence,	also	turned	towards	Bucharest,	seeing	it	as	an	agent	and	ad-
vocate	for	Chișinau	in	the	EU.	Moreover,	Romania	offers	Moldova	the	prospect	
of	reducing	not	only	its	political,	but	also	its	economic	and	energy	dependence	
on	Russia.	Bucharest	is	also	often	seen	as	a	representative	of	Moldovan	interests	
in	international	organisations,	and	as	source	of	the	financial	aid	and	know-how	
necessary	to	conduct	reforms.
The	Romanian	question	is	the	keystone	of	domestic	policy	in	Moldova,	and	is	
regularly	used	by	individual	Moldovan	groups	in	playing	off	their	political	in-
terests.	During	their	time	in	office	in	2001-2009,	the	Communists	willingly	ac-
cused	their	political	opponents	of	wanting	to	merge	Moldova	with	Romania,	
cooperating	with	the	Romanian	authorities,	or	having	their	activities	financed	
by	Romania.	This	not	only	reduced	support	for	their	political	opponents,	but	
also	stirred	up	anti-Romanian	phobia	in	society.	Additionally,	this	anti-Roma-
nianism	fuelled	by	the	fear	of	unification	was	an	element	in	consolidating	the	
country’s	inhabitants	and	calming	domestic	political	and	ethnic	differences.	It	
was	useful	from	the	point	of	view	of	the	Communists,	who	could	easily	present	
themselves	as	the	only	real	political	force	which	was	defending	the	country’s	
independence	and	resisting	those	right-wing	groupings	whose	victory	(from	
the	perspective	of	the	electorate	which	opposed	reunification	with	Romania)	
would	have	run	the	risk	of	Moldova	being	absorbed	by	its	western	neighbour.
The	pro-European	parties	also	draw	upon	the	Romanian	factor	for	their	inter-
nal	political	purposes62.	From	the	perspective	of	the	largest	coalition	party,	the	
62	 In	2010-14	power	was	held	 in	Chișinau	by	a	pro-European	coalition	of	 three	parties,	 the	
PLDM,	PDM	and	PL.	After	the	elections	of	30	November	2014	a	pro-European	minority	coa-
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PLDM,	and	the	Liberal	Party,,	Romania	is	a	factor	which	weakens	the	identity	
model	offered	by	the	Communist	Party	and	strengthens	the	Romanian	elements	
of	Moldovan	identity,	which	in	turn	limits	Russian	influence	(in	socio-cultural	
terms).	The	Moldovan	Democratic	Party,	though	it	is	officially	‘Moldovenist’	
and	opposes	the	increasing	influence	of	Romanian	culture	in	Moldova,	has	been	
willing	to	undertake	political	cooperation	with	the	Romanian	Social	Democratic	
Party	(PSD)	led	by	Prime	Minister	Victor	Ponta.	In	September	2014,	the	lead-
ers	of	both	parties	signed	an	agreement	on	cooperation	in	Bucharest,	which	
provided	for	mutual	support	during	the	election	campaigns	for	the	presidency	
in	Romania	and	the	parliament	in	Moldova	respectively63.	At	the	same	time,	
Ponta	was	openly	supported	in	his	run	for	president	by	the	then	Prime	Minis-
ter	of	Moldova	Iurie	Leanca,	as	was	Klaus	Iohannis	by	Vlad	Filat,	the	leader	of	
the	PLDM,	in	cooperation	with	the	National	Liberals	(PNL)	group	in	which	the	
current	Romanian	president	has	his	political	roots.
The	actions	of	leading	Romanian	politicians	supply	propaganda	fuel	for	those	
political	 forces	 in	Moldova	and	elsewhere	(especially	Russia)	which	oppose	
the	pro-European	factions	and	the	process	of	Chișinau’s	move	westward.	This	
mainly	concerns	the	statements	coming	from	Bucharest	(and	especially	former	
President	Băsescu)	concerning	the	possible	unification	of	Moldova	and	Roma-
nia64.	This	kind	of	rhetoric	from	the	Romanian	government	puts	the	ruling	pro-
European	coalition	in	Moldova	in	a	difficult	situation,	as	it	reinforces	the	argu-
ments	of	the	opposition	parties	(including	Igor	Dodon’s	Socialist	Party	and	the	
PCRM),	whose	politicians	have	long	insisted	to	public	opinion	that	the	European	
integration	project	is	aimed	at	the	‘Romanianisation’	of	Moldova,	depriving	it	of	
its	independence,	and	bringing	it	into	NATO	by	the	back	door.
Moscow	also	uses	this	as	an	argument	against	Romanian	and	EU	involvement	
in	Moldova,	and	in	portraying	a	unification	scenario	which	would	entail	the	
enlargement	of	NATO	and	a	threat	to	Russian	interests.	Declarations	concern-
ing	unification	have	also	raised	tensions	among	Moldova’s	minorities,	primarily	
the	Gagauz	Autonomy,	and	exacerbated	relations	with	the	separatist	authorities	
lition	was	created,	including	only	the	PLDM	and	PDM.	See	Kamil	Całus,	Moldova	has	a	mi-
nority	 coalition,	 OSW Analyses,	 28	 January	 2015:	 http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/
analyses/2015-01-28/moldova-has-a-minority-coalition
63	 The	PDM	helped	the	PSD	run	a	campaign	in	Moldova	targeted	at	Moldovans	with	Romanian	
citizenship.
64	 These	types	of	statements	were	made	regularly	by	Bucharest	during	Băsescu’s	time	in	of-
fice.	More	details	in	Chapter	V.
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in	Transnistria,	whose	residents	have	traditionally	been	afraid	of	‘Romanian	
expansionism’65.	Also,	the	formula	repeated	by	Romanian	politicians	(Băsescu,	
Ponta	and	others),	according	to	which	union	is	conditional	on	the	will	of	the	Mol-
dovan	people,	has	not	been	positively	received	by	some	of	the	elites	in	Chișinau,	
because	from	their	perspective	Moldova	would	be	deprived	of	its	subjectivity	
and	turned	into	a	‘seasonal	state’	.
However,	it	seems	that	with	the	coming	to	power	of	Klaus	Iohannis	as	the	new	
president	of	Romania,	Bucharest’s	rhetoric	in	relation	to	Moldova	will	become	
more	cautious,	which	should	weaken	the	anti-European	opposition’s	arguments,	
and	reduce	the	risk	of	social	tensions	caused	by	the	anti-Romanian	mood	of	part	
of	the	Moldovan	public.
65	 More	details	in	Chapter	V.
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v. The sTaTe oF romanIan-moldovan secTorIal 
cooperaTIon
1. economic and energy cooperation
Since	the	late	1990s	Romania	has	been	an	important	trade	partner	for	and	in-
vestor	in	Moldova,	and	its	role	in	the	Moldovan	economy	is	growing	steadily.	
The	only	exception	to	this	rule	came	in	the	years	of	2009	and	2010,	but	the	
deterioration	of	trade	relations	at	that	time	(see	Figure	1)	was	due	to	external	
factors,	primarily	the	global	financial	crisis.	Whereas	in	2005	Moldova	exported	
goods	to	Romania	with	a	total	value	of	US$111.6	million,	this	figure	had	almost	
quadrupled	to	US$434	million	in	2014,	accounting	for	over	18.5%	of	total	Mol-
dovan	exports.	In	the	same	period,	imports	from	Romania	rose	almost	three	
times	from	US$257.3	million	in	2005	to	US$803	million	in	2014,	representing	
15%	of	total	Moldovan	imports66.	Both	of	these	indicators	ranked	Romania	first	
among	Moldova’s	key	trading	partners	in	2014.	Previously,	Russia	had	occupied	
this	place	for	many	years,	but	as	a	result	of	the	embargo	imposed	by	Moscow	on	
alcoholic	products	and	the	majority	of	Moldovan	fruit	production	(in	September	
2013	and	July	2014	respectively),	Russia	has	lost	its	former	position	in	its	trade	
with	Moldova.
Figure 1.	Moldovan	exports	to	Romania	(as	a	percentage	of	total	exports)	in	
the	years	2005-2014
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sources:	The	National	Bureau	of	Statistics	of	the	Republic	of	Moldova,	the	National	Institute	of	Statistics	
of	Romania,	UN	Comtrade	and	the	WTO
66	 Data	from	the	National	Bureau	of	Statistics	of	Moldova	(NBS).
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Figure 2.	Moldovan	imports	from	Romania	(as	a	percentage	of	total	exports)	
in	the	years	2005-2014
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sources:	The	National	Bureau	of	Statistics	of	the	Republic	of	Moldova,	the	National	Institute	of	Statistics	
of	Romania,	UN	Comtrade	and	the	WTO
Figure 3.	Trade	between	Moldova	and	Romania	(as	a	percentage	of	Moldova’s	
total	trade)	in	the	years	2005	to	2014
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sources:	The	National	Bureau	of	Statistics	of	the	Republic	of	Moldova,	the	National	Institute	of	Statistics	
of	Romania,	UN	Comtrade	and	the	WTO
Moldova’s	importance	for	Romanian	trade	is	negligible,	which	is	mainly	due	to	
the	small	size	of	the	Moldovan	market	and	its	limited	absorption	capacity.	As	
a	result,	the	trade	turnover	between	the	two	countries	does	not	exceed	1%	of	
Romania’s	total	foreign	trade	volume	(see	Figure	2).	Romania	primarily	sells	fuel	
to	Moldova	(especially	gasoline	and	diesel),	which	represents	more	than	half	
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of	its	exports	to	that	country67.	The	rest	of	Romania’s	exports	include	chemical	
and	metal	products.	Meanwhile	Moldova	primarily	sells	Romania	cables	and	
insulated	electric	conductors	(about	35%	of	total	exports)	as	well	as	vegetable	
products	and	sugar.
Figure 4.	Moldova’s	share	in	Romanian	trade	(as	a	percentage	of	Romania’s	
total	trade)
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sources:	The	National	Institute	of	Statistics	of	Romania,	UN	Comtrade	and	the	WTO
Romania	is	currently	the	sixth	largest	major	investor	in	Moldova,	accounting	
for	7%	of	the	total	funds	invested	in	this	country68.	The	most	important	Roma-
nian	companies	operating	on	the	Moldovan	market	include	the	fuel	giants	Rom-
petrol	and	Petrom,	the	Banca	Comercială	Română	(BCR),	the	media	companies	
Jurnal	Trust	Media	and	Media	Pro,	the	building	company	Construct-Arabesque,	
European	Drinks	(food	industry),	and	Romstal	(sanitary	fittings,	heating	sys-
tems).	In	May	2014	the	company	Dedeman,	the	main	seller	of	building	materi-
als	in	Romania,	also	announced	its	entry	onto	the	Moldovan	market,	as	well	
as	investments	of	€30	million69.	Romanian	investors	are	primarily	attracted	to	
Moldova	by	its	workforce,	which	is	cheaper	than	in	Romania,	its	knowledge	of	
Romanian	and	Russian,	and	its	usually	high	qualifications.	Despite	the	Russian	
trade	restrictions	introduced	in	2014,	Moldova	is	still	a	member	of	the	CIS’s	free	
trade	zone,	which	ensures	Romanian	investors	access	to	the	wider	post-Soviet	
67	 In	2013,	Romania	exported	fuel	worth	US$393	million	to	Moldova.	Data	from	the	National	
Bank	of	Moldova.
68	 It	should	be	noted	that	in	2013	the	total	volume	of	Romanian	investments	in	Moldova	fell	by	
22%,	although	this	is	considered	to	be	a	temporary	phenomenon	resulting	from	the	deterio-
ration	of	the	economic	situation	in	Romania.	For	more,	see	http://www.ukrinform.ua/rus/
news/ruminskie_investitsii_v_moldovu_sokratilis_na_22_1593553
69	 http://vesti.md/?mod=news&id=29214
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market.	Another	motivation	for	Romanian	companies	is	the	tax	incentives	Mol-
dova	offers	to	foreign	investors,	and	the	tax	rates,	which	are	generally	lower	
than	Romania’s.	One	specific	way	of	investing	Romanian	capital	in	Moldova	has	
been	the	creation	of	Moldovan-Romanian	companies,	a	trend	which	is	growing	
dynamically.	In	2009	about	650	such	companies	had	been	registered,	and	as	
many	as	1200	by	the	beginning	of	2013.
Since	the	1990s	Romania	has	been	trying	to	boost	its	role	as	a	provider	of	energy	
resources	to	Moldova.	The	country	is	a	major	supplier	of	gasoline	and	diesel	oil	
to	Moldova	(in	2013	Moldova	covered	72.4%	and	60.5%	respectively	of	its	demand	
for	these	fuels	with	imports	from	Romania)70.	Attempts	are	also	being	made	to	
enable	the	delivery	of	Romanian	natural	gas	to	Moldova.	On	27	August	2014,	the	
operation	of	an	interconnector	between	the	Romanian	city	of	Iași	and	Ungheni	in	
Moldova	was	inaugurated.	This	connection	will	ultimately	allow	the	transmis-
sion	of	about	1.5	bcm	of	gas	annually,	which	would	meet	right-bank	Moldova’s	
current	needs	(about	1	bcm	annually)	with	room	to	spare.	Currently,	however,	
the	interconnector	can	only	use	about	5%	of	the	bandwidth,	due	to	the	lack	of	
a	connection	with	Chișinau	(which	is	the	main	gas	customer	in	right-bank	Mol-
dova),	as	well	as	the	inefficient	compression	and	transportation	infrastructure	
on	the	Romanian	side.	Moldova’s	Economics	Minister	Andrian	Candu	declared	in	
September	2014	that	the	pipeline	would	reach	full	transmission	capacity	by	2016,	
but	this	seems	unlikely71.	Despite	these	technical	limitations,	Moldova	signed	
a	contract	for	gas	supplies	from	Romania	in	December	2014.	According	to	the	
agreement,	the	gas	from	this	source	will	be	about	US$65	cheaper	than	Russian	
gas	(whose	2014	price	amounts	to	about	US$330).	Work	is	continuing	on	upgrad-
ing	the	power	transmission	buses	between	Moldova	and	Romania	(via	Iași–Un-
gheni–Străşeni	and	Vulcănești–Isaccea),	whose	completion	will	allow	electricity	
imports	from	Romania,	and	allow	Moldova	to	diversify	its	supplies	more	widely	
than	at	present.	According	to	announcements	by	senior	representatives	of	the	two	
countries,	energy	transmission	could	start	in	201572.	Currently	Moldova	‘imports’	
70	 Data	from	the	National	Bureau	of	Statistics	of	Moldova.
71	 http://newsmaker.md/rus/novosti/v-2016-godu-kishinev-poluchit-gaz-iz-rumynii	
For	more	on	the	interconnector	issues	and	Moldova’s	energy	problems,	see	see	Kamil	Całus,	
The	Iasi-Ungheni	pipeline:	a	means	of	achieving	energy	independence	from	Russia?	Mol-
dova’s	attempts	at	gas	supply	diversification,	OSW Analyses,	 11	October	2015:	http://www.
osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2013-10-11/iasi-ungheni-pipeline-a-means-
achieving-energy-independence
72	 http://ava.md/economics/023204-s-2015-goda-moldova-smozhet-importirovat-elektro	ener	-
giq-iz-ruminii.html
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electricity	from	the	Moldovan	GRES	power	plant	located	in	Transnistria,	and	the	
Ukrainian	company	DTEK	Power	Trade73.
Romanian	companies	are	also	involved	in	infrastructure	projects	in	Moldova.	
The	company	Electroputere	VFU	has	signed	a	contract	to	modernise	the	Moldo-
van	rail	company’s	passenger	trains	(diesel	multiple	units).	In	2010,	CertSIGN	
won	the	tender	to	introduce	tachographs	for	the	international	road	transporta-
tion	system	to	Moldova,	and	in	2011	PA&CO	International	signed	a	contract	with	
the	government	to	renovate	the	Bălți–Sărăteni	road	section	(a	year	later,	the	
same	company	also	won	a	tender	to	construct	another	section).	The	possibility	
of	either	modernising	the	current	or	constructing	a	new	railway	line	(to	Euro-
pean	standards)	between	Iași	and	Ungheni,	as	well	as	building	bridges	over	the	
Prut	and	a	highway	connecting	the	two	countries,	has	also	been	discussed	for	
many	years,	although	without	tangible	results.	However,	apart	from	political	
declarations	and	memoranda,	no	real	work	on	these	projects	has	started	so	far.
It	should	be	noted	that	although	economic	cooperation	at	the	level	of	private	
operators	is	rising	rapidly	and	relatively	easily,	large	strategic	economic	pro-
jects	involving	the	governments	in	Bucharest	and	Chișinau	regularly	run	into	
difficulties.	This	is	true	of	both	energy	projects,	whose	implementation	by	the	
originally	planned	dates	has	been	greatly	delayed,	and	 infrastructure	pro-
jects.	The	above-mentioned	contract	to	modernise	the	railway	trains	ended	in	
scandal.	Of	the	planned	15	trains	only	four	were	renovated,	while	none	of	them	
remained	operational	for	more	than	a	few	weeks.	The	companies	renovating	
the	roads	were	accused	of	corruption	during	the	tender	phase,	and	numerous	
projects	discussed	at	the	intergovernmental	level	never	emerged	from	the	plan-
ning	stage.	The	main	reasons	for	these	omissions	were	the	inefficiency	of	the	
administrative	bodies	in	Moldova	and	Romania,	a	lack	of	funding,	and	the	often	
unfavourable	political	climates	due	to	changes	of	government	in	Chișinau.
One	particular	form	of	economic	cooperation	is	the	development	aid	donated	by	
Romania	in	2007	in	connection	with	its	entry	into	the	European	Union.	Since	
the	beginning	Moldova	has	been	the	main	recipient	of	that	aid	from	Bucharest,	
and	receives	approximately	a	third	of	all	Romanian	aid.	The	amount	of	this	aid	
is	relatively	small;	the	prediction	for	2015	is	for	the	implementation	of	projects	
with	a	total	value	of	about	€800,00074.
73	 Ibid.
74	 http://independent.md/mae-al-romaniei-aloca-circa-35-din-bugetul-de-asistenta-pentru-
dezvoltare-pe-2015-republicii-moldova/#.VNjLP7M5Dcu
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2. security co-operation
Despite	the	fact	that	since	1991	the	two	countries	have	adopted	several	reciprocal	
agreements	on	security	(including	an	agreement	on	cooperation	in	the	military	
sphere	[1992],	an	agreement	on	cooperation	in	civil	defence	during	peacetime	
[1994]	and	an	agreement	on	cooperation	in	military	transport	[1997]),	the	real	co-
operation	in	this	field	de facto	began	after	the	Alliance	for	European	Integration	
came	to	power	in	2009.	During	the	rule	of	the	pro-European	coalition,	Chișinau	
and	Bucharest	signed	a	comprehensive	agreement	on	military	cooperation	and	
an	agreement	on	police	cooperation	and	border	protection,	among	others.	The	
implementation	of	these	agreements	faces	serious	problems,	however,	mainly	
due	to	the	sluggishness	of	the	Romanian	legislative	authorities.	Nevertheless,	
there	has	been	a	noticeable	rise	in	cooperation	in	the	field	of	security.
The	first	unofficial	draft	comprehensive	agreement	on	military	cooperation	(re-
placing	the	document	signed	in	1992)	appeared	in	201075,	although	a	new	agree-
ment	on	cooperation	in	the	military	field	was	eventually	signed	on	20	April	
2012.	This	document	covers	a	very	wide	range	of	bilateral	cooperation	in	areas	
such	as	defence	policy	(including	joint	defence	planning),	intelligence,	logistics,	
training,	military	research,	airspace	control,	sharing	military	testing	grounds,	
and	joint	participation	in	peacekeeping	missions	carried	out	under	the	aegis	of	
the	UN,	the	OSCE	and	the	EU76.	Among	the	forms	of	cooperation,	the	bill	lists	
mutual	consultations	and	visits	(including	conferences),	 joint	exercises	and	
military	training,	exchanges	of	human	resources	and	documentation,	as	well	
as	constant	contact	between	both	countries’	military	structures	responsible	for	
crisis	response.	The	agreement	also	envisages	the	creation	of	a	Joint	Military	
Commission	(Comisia	militară	mixtă)	which	would	meet	annually;	this	body’s	
main	task	is	to	analyse	the	state	of	the	two	countries’	cooperation	and	determine	
the	agenda	for	the	next	year,	which	should	make	optimum	use	of	the	opportu-
nities	arising	from	the	agreement’s	existence77.	This	document	also	specifies	
75	 http://moldnews.md/rus/news/31838
76	 http://www.lege-online.ro/lr-LEGE-75%20-2013-%28146795%29.html	 The	 list	 of	 areas	 for	
cooperation	between	Moldova	and	Romania	listed	in	the	document	is	very	long,	and	has	27	
items,	including	such	specific	examples	as	military	history.	Moreover,	the	deal	does	not	fi-
nalise	the	list	of	those	areas,	stating	that	“the	parties	may	cooperate	in	other	areas	not	listed	
in	this	document”.
77	 Both	 anti-Romanian	 forces	within	Moldova,	 especially	 the	PCRM	and	Transnistria,	 and	
Russia	have	argued	that	the	agreement	violates	Moldova’s	neutral	status.	They	have	regu-
larly	tried	to	present	the	Joint	Military	Commission	as	a	kind	of	central	joint	force	command	
headquarters,	rather	than	a	consultative	body.
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a	number	of	technical	issues	relating	to	principles	of	organisation,	particularly	
the	financing	of	joint	exercises,	training,	etc.	Additionally	in	the	military	field,	
on	2	December	2013	the	two	countries	signed	an	agreement	on	the	mutual	pro-
tection	of	confidential	military	information	and	on	cooperation	in	the	field	of	
military	education.	These	agreements	were	intended	in	practice	to	develop	the	
provisions	of	the	agreement	‘On	cooperation	in	the	military	field’.	Under	these,	
about	100	Moldovan	soldiers	go	to	Romania	every	year	for	training78.
Despite	declarations	from	both	Chișinau	and	Bucharest,	Romanian-Moldovan	
cooperation	in	the	security	field	has	so	far	been	very	limited.	Apart	from	limited	
activities	of	an	educational	nature,	instances	of	joint	military	exercises	or	techni-
cal	support,	for	example,	have	been	relatively	rare.	Importantly,	Romania	does	
not	have	a	realistic	strategy	for	guaranteeing	the	safety	of	Moldova,	and	moreover	
it	has	not	even	taken	any	concrete	steps	to	create	or	implement	such	a	strategy79.	
Bucharest	is	trying	to	interest	NATO	in	the	problem	of	Moldova’s	security,	and	
also	sees	the	Alliance	a	guarantor	of	its	security.	At	the	same	time,	despite	the	
small	scale	of	their	cooperation	in	reality,	it	is	Romania	(next	to	the	US)	which	re-
mains	Chișinau’s	main	partner	in	the	military	dimension.	In	addition	to	security	
cooperation	in	the	military	field,	Romania	also	provides	Chișinau	with	ongoing	
support	for	finding	a	political	solution	to	the	Transnistrian	conflict.
3. cultural and educational cooperation
Cooperation	in	the		broadly	understood	area	of	culture	is	most	sensitive	to	chang-
es	in	the	political	mood	between	the	two	countries.	Despite	this,	Romania	has	
been	able	to	take	some	actions	in	that	area,	regardless	of	political	issues.	A	key	
element	of	this	cooperation	is	the	scholarship	programme	which	Bucharest	has	
run	and	funded	since	the	early	nineties,	through	which	about	2500	Moldovan	
citizens	study	at	Romanian	universities	every	year.	Since	2009	this	number	has	
more	than	doubled80.	Romania	also	regularly	sponsors	the	purchase	of	books	
78	 http://www.army.md/?lng=2&action=show&cat=124&obj=2359
79	 The	two	main	documents	adopted	by	the	parliament	in	Bucharest	on	security	issues,	the	
National	Defence	Strategy	and	the	National	Security	Strategy	of	Romania,	relate	to	Mol-
dova	in	very	general	terms.	The	legislature	declares	therein	its	desire	to	extend	the	area	of	
‘stability	and	security’	eastwards,	and	expresses	interest	in	the	problem	of	Transnistrian	
separatism	and	concern	at	the	illegal	presence	of	foreign	(Russian)	troops	on	the	territory	
of	Moldova.	Compare	http://www.presidency.ro/static/ordine/SSNR/SSNR.pdf	and	http://
www.presidency.ro/static/ordine/SNAp/SNAp.pdf
80	 For	the	year	2014/2015,	the	Romanian	side	committed	itself	to	fund	6000	scholarships,	in-
cluding	2800	for	undergraduate	students,	1500	for	high	school	students,	and	125	scholarships	
for	doctoral	students.	http://ava.md/society/025812-ruminiya-predostavit-moldove-5-tisy-
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for	libraries,	and	in	October	2014	it	provided	Moldova	with	100	minibuses	for	
schools	cost-free.	Bucharest	also	actively	supports	inter-university	cooperation.
In	2010,	a	Romanian	Cultural	Institute	was	launched	in	Chișinau,	whose	mission	
includes	organising	exhibitions,	conferences,	concerts,	financing	scholarship	
programs,	language	courses,	etc.	It	also	helps	promote	Moldovan	artists	and	
creators	in	Romania,	which	from	the	Institute’s	perspective	is	seen	as	an	ele-
ment	of	supporting	Romanian	culture	(Moldovan	artists	are	considered	part	of	
the	Romanian	cultural	space).
Romania’s	particular	importance	for	culture	in	Moldova	was	highlighted	in	
a	report	funded	from	the	EU	budget	entitled	Preparatory activities. Culture in 
the EU’s external relations,	in	which	Romania	was	designated	as	a	country	of	key	
importance	for	Moldova’s	cultural	relations81.
Romania	is	also	present	in	Moldova’s	media	space.	Since	1999,	the	basic	cable	
networks	in	major	cities	have	offered	the	private	Romanian	PRO	TV	channel.	
After	a	break	of	some	years	(caused	by	the	political	conflict	between	Bucharest	
and	Moldova’s	ruling	Communists),	rebroadcasting	of	the	first	channel	of	Ro-
manian	public	television	TVR	resumed	in	2010.	In	addition,	in	2014	the	parties	
agreed	to	broadcast	both	TVR	and	Moldova1	respectively	on	the	Moldovan	and	
Romanian	cable	operators.	The	Romanian	channel	Antena	1	is	also	locally	re-
broadcast.	A	Moldovan	version	of	the	Romanian	daily	newspaper	Adevarul	(the	
second	largest	newspaper	in	Moldova)	is	available	on	the	press	market,	as	are	
various	weeklies	and	monthlies	commonly	published	in	Romania82.
Romania’s	actions	in	Moldova	in	the	field	of	culture	and	education	should	be	
seen	as	relatively	effective.	They	meet	the	public	interest,	and	are	received	posi-
tively	in	most	cases.	Romanian	activities	in	the	cultural	dimension	are	basically	
directed	only	to	the	Romanian-speaking	population,	or	more	broadly	speak-
ing,	to	ethnic	Moldovans83.	As	a	result,	they	improve	Romania’s	image	among	
this	part	of	the	population,	although	they	often	deepen	the	distrust	felt	by	the	
ach-stipendii.html	 and	 http://aif.md/rumyniya-uvelichila-kolichestvo-stipendij-dlya-
moldavskix-studentov/
81	 http://cultureinexternalrelations.eu/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Moldova-country-re-
port.pdf
82	 It	is	worth	noting	that	the	availability	of	Romanian	media	in	Moldova	is	significantly	less	
than	that	of	Russian	media.
83	 The	exception	to	this	rule,	which	could	be	a	harbinger	of	changes	in	Romanian	policy	in	
this	area,	was	the	launch	in	June	2015	of	the	Romanian	Information	Centre	at	the	University	
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Russian-speaking	population.	This	problem	also	applies	to	Romanian	media	in	
Moldova,	which	(with	a	few	exceptions	in	the	case	of	the	press)	only	operate	in	
the	Romanian	language,	without	reaching	the	Russian-speaking	minorities.	
The	result	is	that	the	Russian	media	are	the	main	carriers	of	popular	culture	in	
Moldova,	reaching	a	wider	audience	and	exerting	greater	influence	on	that	sec-
tion	of	the	population’s	attitudes	and	opinions	than	Romanian	media.	Romania’s	
lack	of	interest	in	Moldova’s	minorities	in	the	cultural	and	educational	dimen-
sion	is	primarily	due	to	the	fear	of	being	accused	of	trying	to	‘Romanianise’	the	
Russian-speaking	inhabitants	of	the	country,	as	well	as	for	ideological	reasons.	
This	is	why	Romanians	mainly	believe	cooperation	with	ethnic	Moldovans,	who	
are	closer	to	them,	to	be	more	reasonable.
of	Comrat,	at	Romania’s	initiative	and	funded	by	Bucharest.	See	http://gagauzia.md/news-
view.php?l=ru&idc=390&id=5849
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vI.  The Idea oF unIFyIng moldova wITh romanIa
1. The revival of the idea of unification
The	trend	towards	the	unification	of	Moldova	and	Romania	took	on	a	mass	
character	at	the	end	of	the	eighties.	Proponents	of	unification,	called	Unionists	
(from	the	Romanian	Unirea,	union)	preached	the	need	to	revise	the	Molotov-
Ribbentrop	Pact,	on	the	basis	of	which	the	Soviet	Union	annexed	Bessarabia	in	
1940,	as	well	as	the	return	of	the	historically	Romanian	lands	of	Moldova	to	the	
motherland.	The	catalyst	for	these	processes	was,	on	the	one	hand,	the	weakness	
and	subsequent	disintegration	of	the	Soviet	Union,	which	opened	up	the	theo-
retical	possibility	of	a	revision	of	borders.	On	the	other	hand,	there	was	a	rise	
in	pro-Romanian	sentiments	within	Moldova	itself,	which	was	manifested	in	
the	increasing	political	significance	of	the	Moldovan	Popular	Front	in	Moldova	
(among	other	things).	A	major	role	in	the	development	of	these	trends	was	also	
played	by	the	emergence	of	genuine	party-political	competition	in	Romania	
itself,	as	the	result	of	the	overthrow	of	Nicolae	Ceaușescu.	Pro-unification	slo-
gans	were	proclaimed	by	many	new	Romanian	groups,	because	these	enjoyed	
considerable	popularity	among	the	electorate.
The	unionist	idea	was	particularly	strong	in	Moldova	during	the	period	of	win-
ning	independence	from	the	USSR.	After	the	coalition	of	the	Moldovan	Popular	
Front	and	the	pro-reformist	Communists	came	to	power	in	1990,	active	meas-
ures	were	launched	in	Chișinau	which	favoured	the	effective	unification	of	the	
two	countries.	Moldova’s	declaration	of	independence,	adopted	on	27	August	
1991,	openly	condemned	the	separation	of	Bessarabia	from	Romania	and	rec-
ognised	Romanian,	and	not	Moldovan,	as	the	official	language84.	This	docu-
ment	thus	created	a	legal	basis	for	the	possible	reunification	of	Moldova	with	
Romania,	which	both	the	then	government	in	Chișinau85	and	the	public	mood	
favoured.	The	Romanian	flag	and	national	anthem	were	declared	as	official	state	
symbols	of	Moldova.	The	idea	of	unification	also	rapidly	gained	support	in	Ro-
mania	itself.	Bucharest	did	recognise	the	independence	of	Moldova,	but	its	dec-
laration	implicitly	assumed	that	independence	was	merely	a	transitional	step	on	
the	road	to	reunification	with	Romania.	Visa	restrictions	for	Moldovans	were	
84	 The	Declaration	of	Independence	of	the	Republic	of	Moldova,	http://lex.justice.md/index.
php?action=view&view=doc&lang=1&id=313228
85	 During	his	first	official	visit	to	Romania	in	February	1991,	the	Moldovan	President	Mircea	
Snegur	stressed	the	ethnic	unity	of	the	residents	of	both	countries,	speaking	of		“Romanians	
on	both	sides	of	the	Prut”.
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lifted	relatively	quickly,	and	a	simplified	border	traffic	regime	was	introduced.	
Bucharest	also	organised	assistance	in	the	form	of	books	and	textbooks	in	the	
Romanian	language	for	schools	and	libraries	in	Moldova.
Apart	from	these	de facto	symbolic	actions,	however,	the	Romanian	authorities	
failed	to	undertake	any	real	efforts	to	support	the	unification	being	promoted	by	
groups	in	both	countries.	This	was	related	primarily	to	the	radically	deteriorat-
ing	economic	situation	in	Romania,	as	well	as	the	political	instability	after	the	
fall	of	Ceaușescu.	These	factors	forced	Bucharest	to	focus	primarily	on	its	do-
mestic	situation.	The	situation	was	complicated	by	the	rising	tensions	between	
Chișinau	and	the	self-proclaimed	authorities	in	Gagauzia	and	Transnistria,	
which	on	19	August	and	2	September	1990	respectively	declared	their	independ-
ence	from	the	rest	of	the	republic.	In	addition,	the	armed	conflict	between	Mol-
dova	and	the	breakaway	Transnistria	which	took	place	in	1992	clearly	weakened	
the	position	and	image	of	Romania	in	Moldova.	Although	Bucharest	was	trying	
to	help	the	Moldovans	in	their	fight	against	the	separatists,	its	help	was	far	from	
sufficient,	and	disappointed	Moldova’s	pro-Romanian	circles.	Transnistria’s	vic-
tory,	supported	by	the	authorities	in	Moscow,	was	a	kind	of	demonstration	of	
force	by	Russia,	which	after	a	short	period	of	weakness	resulting	from	the	col-
lapse	of	the	USSR	began	to	regain	its	influence	in	Moldova.	At	the	same	time,	
Unionist	sentiment	in	Romania	and	Moldova	began	to	drop	off	visibly.
Despite	the	support	of	large	parts	of	Romanian	political	circles,	then-president	
Iliescu	never	spoke	out	clearly	in	favour	of	the	unification	of	the	two	countries,	
as	he	was	aware	of	the	problems,	both	economic	and	political,	which	would	
have	resulted	from	it	(the	fact	of	the	stationing	of	Russian	troops	in	Transnis-
tria	played	no	small	part	in	these	considerations).	The	Romanian	authorities	de 
facto	acknowledged	the	existence	of	two	separate	Romanian	states	and,	basically	
abandoning	the	idea	of	a	unification	along	German	lines,	adopted	a	strategy	of	
gradual	re-integration	by	creating	a	common	economic	and	cultural	space,	as	
well	as	a	process	of	slow	political	integration86.
In	Chișinau	in	1994,	the	pro-unification	forces	left	power.	The	new	parliament	
took	a	number	of	actions	aimed	at	consolidating	Moldovan	statehood	and	drop-
ping	Unionist	rhetoric.	A	Constitution	was	adopted	according	to	which	the	of-
ficial	language	in	the	republic	was	Moldovan,	the	flag	was	modified	to	distin-
guish	it	from	Romania’s,	and	the	national	anthem	was	changed.	The	so-called	
86	 Managing	Conflict	in	the	Former	Soviet	Union:	Russian	and	American	Perspectives,	p.	203.
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independence	referendum87	also	confirmed	the	mood	of	most	people	 in	 the	
country.	At	first,	Bucharest	denounced	the	referendum’s	organisation,	recog-
nising	its	results	only	as	a	‘survey’,	but	at	the	end	of	the	year,	President	Iliescu	
said	in	a	speech	that	“today	Romania	recognises	Moldova	as	an	independent	
country,	but	maybe	one	day,	some	joyous	day,	we	will	become	witnesses	to	the	
full	cultural,	historical	and	territorial	reunification	of	this	land	with	us.	On	
the	other	hand,	if	there	can	be	two	German	states,	why	cannot	two	Romanias	
exist?”88.	This	declaration	significantly	weakened	the	role	of	pro-unification	
discourse	in	Romanian	politics	over	the	next	few	years.
2. The current discourse on unification 
Over	the	following	ten	years,	Bucharest’s	foreign	policy	was	primarily	focused	
on	strengthening	Romania	as	much	as	possible	within	Western	structures.	The	
priority	in	this	process,	known	as	the	‘return	to	Europe’,	became	integration	
with	NATO	and	the	EU,	whereas	relations	with	Moldova,	and	in	particular	the	
issue	of	the	possible	merger	of	the	two	countries	became	a	secondary	or	even	
a	tertiary	problem.	Romanian	politicians	are	mostly	aware	that	raising	revi-
sionist	ideas	of	the	Unirea	would	in	fact	be	perceived	in	the	West	as	an	un-
ambiguously	negative	step,	and	would	form	an	obstacle	to	the	aforementioned	
plans	for	bringing	Romania	closer	to	the	West.
The	gradual	resumption	of	unification	issues	in	the	public	debate	in	Romania	
started	in	2004	when	Traian	Băsescu	assumed	the	office	of	President.	In	his	
first	months	in	office,	his	efforts	to	intensify	relations	with	Chișinau	caused	
the	tactical	pro-Western	turn	which	President	Voronin	made	at	the	start	of	
2004,	in	connection	with	the	failure	of	the	Kozak	Memorandum	and	the	loss	
of	Moscow’s	support.	The	subject	of	unification	began	increasingly	to	occupy	
the	public	space.	Moldovan	and	Romanian	newspapers	published	articles	and	
analyses	devoted	to	the	technical	issues,	the	scenarios	and	the	costs	linked	to	
possible	unification;	they	also	conducted	numerous	polls	on	the	matter.	This	
discourse	was	elevated	to	a	whole	new	level	on	1	July	2006,	when	Băsescu	offered	
Chișinau	the	chance	for	Moldova	to	join	Romania	before	the	latter’s	entry	to	the	
EU.	Although	the	ruling	Moldovan	Communists	firmly	rejected	the	Romanian	
president’s	proposal,	it	still	led	to	increased	interest	in	the	subject	of	unification	
87	 The	vote	did	not	meet	the	formal	requirements	for	a	referendum	(among	other	matters,	it	
was	held	just	a	week	after	the	parliamentary	elections,	and	not	after	the	legally	required	
interval	of	90	days),	and	so	it	was	officially	called	a	sociological	survey.
88	 Managing	Conflict	...,	op. cit.,	p.	204.
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in	both	countries.	Another	impetus	which	intensified	the	discourse	on	unifica-
tion	in	Moldova	was	President	Băsescu’s	declaration	on	27	November	2013	(on	
the	eve	of	Moldova’s	initialling	the	Association	Agreement	with	the	EU)	on	Ro-
manian	television;	he	announced	that	unification	with	Moldova	was	Romania’s	
third	strategic	objective89	(after	joining	NATO	and	the	EU).
Băsescu’s	rhetoric	led	to	a	marked	increase	in	the	importance	of	the	unification	
discourse	in	Romanian	politics,	and	increased	public	interest	in	the	subject.	
Romanian	voters	have	come	to	expect	clear	statements	from	their	leaders	re-
garding	Bucharest’s	policy	towards	Moldova.	As	a	result,	in	recent	years,	every	
major	Romanian	politician	has	been	de facto	forced	to	invoke	the	idea	of	Unirea	
in	their	rhetoric,	which	is	particularly	noticeable	in	pre-election	periods.	In	
a	sense,	Victor	Ponta,	Romania’s	prime	minister	and	the	favourite	to	win	the	
presidential	elections	in	Romania	in	2014,	made	the	issue	of	unification	the	cor-
nerstone	of	his	election	campaign.	Ponta	entered	the	election	as	‘the	president	
who	will	unite	us’,	and	in	his	election	program	stated	that	“Romania	needs	a	new	
Grand	Unification”.	Although	he	stressed	at	the	same	time	that	he	was	referring	
to	the	unity	of	all	Romanians,	who	had	been	divided	as	a	result	of	ten	years	of	
President	Băsescu,	it	was	clear	that	his	rhetoric	referred	to	a	possible	future	
unification	of	Romania	and	Moldova.	The	pressure	from	the	electorate	during	
these	elections	was	so	high	that	even	Klaus	Iohannis,	who	had	not	previously	
referred	to	Moldovan	issues	in	any	way90,	declared	in	a	pre-election	interview	
that	“without	the	votes	of	the	inhabitants	of	Bessarabia,	no	Romanian	president	
can	ever	fully	be	president”.	He	also	stressed	that	“if	Moldovans	want	unifica-
tion,	then	no-one	will	stop	them”91.	However,	after	Iohannis	won	the	elections	
in	December	2014,	there	was	a	clear	muting	of	the	pro-unionist	accents.
Moldova’s	unification	discourse	clearly	lost	its	importance	after	the	referendum	
of	1994,	and	remained	so	until	2001,	playing	a	marginal	role	in	public	debate	
within	the	country	until	the	rise	to	power	of	the	PCRM	and	President	Vladimir	
Voronin.	Its	importance	increased	when	the	Communists	took	power,	as	they	
89	 http://stiri.tvr.ro/traian-basescu-la-tvr--urmatorul-proiect-pentru-romania-trebuie-sa-
fie-vrem-sa-ne-intregim-tara-_37653.html
90	 In	 November	 2014	 Iohannis	 admitted	 publicly	 that	 he	 had	 never	 visited	 Chișinau	 or	
Chernivtsi.	 This	 statement	was	met	with	 public	 criticism,	 and	 intensified	 a	wave	 of	 al-
legations	 that	 Iohannis	 was	 uninterested	 in	 the	 question	 of	 Bessarabia.	 http://www.
agerpres.ro/politica/2014/11/11/iohannis-a-declarat-ca-nu-a-fost-niciodata-la-cernauti-si-
la-Chișinau-21-12-21
91	 http://ziarulnational.md/exclusiv-klaus-iohannis-fara-votul-basarabenilor-niciun-pre-
sedinte-al-romaniei-nu-ar-fi-un-presedinte-implinit/
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had	built	their	political	support	on	firm	resistance	to	Romania’s	alleged	efforts	
to	absorb	Moldova.	The	party’s	political	interest	lay	in	making	their	electorate	
fearful	of	the	Romanians.	As	a	result,	the	issue	of	unification	was	present	for	
the	next	eight	years	in	the	public	space,	albeit	at	different	levels	of	intensity92,	
and	was	consistently	presented	in	a	negative	light.	The	Communists	found	it	
easy	to	exploit	allegations	of	pro-unionism	in	discrediting	the	pro-European	
opposition	parties	and	the	pro-Romanian	groupings	in	the	eyes	of	the	elector-
ate.	The	situation	changed	after	the	parliamentary	elections	in	2009,	when	the	
pro-European	groups	that	established	the	Alliance	for	European	Integration	
(AIE)	coalition	removed	the	PCRM	from	power.	These	groups	see	Romania	as	
their	country’s	main	advocate	in	the	process	of	European	integration	and	thus,	
for	purely	pragmatic	reasons,	they	sought	from	the	beginning	to	rebuild	bilat-
eral	relations	with	Romania	to	the	best	possible	extent.	The	historical-identity	
conflicts	which	characterised	the	rule	of	the	PCRM	were	silenced.	Chișinau	has	
also	given	up	pushing	for	a	solution	to	these	issues,	as	they	could	adversely	affect	
the	two	countries’	mutual	relations,	including	on	the	issue	of	the	border	treaty.	
At	the	same	time,	the	declared	Romanophile	Mihail	Ghimpu,	the	head	of	the	
pro-Romanian	Liberal	Party,	took	over	as	acting	President	after	the	Communist	
Vladimir	Voronin.	As	the	coalition	had	hoped,	this	resulted	in	an	increase	in	
Bucharest’s	goodwill	in	relation	to	Chișinau.	This	also	revived	the	hopes	of	those	
(then	marginal)	political	and	social	movements	(see	below)	which	favoured	the	
unification	of	Romania	and	Moldova.	The	new	government	did	not	support	them	
in	any	way,	and	(in	contrast	to	the	Communists)	maintained	a	neutral	attitude	
towards	their	activities	and	slogans.	Talk	of	unification	was	fuelled	from	two	
sources:	the	pro-unification	groups,	and	the	opposition	sounding	the	alarm	
against	it.	However,	despite	opening	up	and	extending	the	discussion	about	
unification	in	tandem	with	the	new	coalition’s	rise	to	power,	this	problem	never	
became	a	major	focus	for	the	Moldovan	public.
3. political parties on the problem of unification
In	Moldova	at	present,	none	of	the	major	political	formations	officially	supports	
the	idea	of		unifying	the	two	countries.	The	leftist	and	centre-left	groupings,	i.e.	
the	PCRM	under	Vladimir	Voronin,	the	Party	of	Socialists	led	by	Igor	Dodon,	
and	the	Democratic	Party	of	Marian	Lupu,	pro-European	but	‘Moldovenist’	in	
its	rhetoric,	all	unequivocally	oppose	the	potential	merger	of	the	two	states	
92	 As	discussed,	Romanian-Moldovan	relations	between	2004	and	2006	proceeded	relatively	
well.	Controversial	topics	such	as	the	issue	of	unification	were	not	raised	in	Moldova	during	
that	time.
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and	object	very	strongly	when	Bucharest	raises	the	matter.	These	parties	also	
view	 the	activities	of	unification	movements	 in	Moldova	very	negatively93.	
This	is	understandable,	as	all	these	parties	appeal	to	an	electorate	which	de-
clares	its	attachment	to	a	Moldovan	identity	separate	from	the	Romanian	(i.e.	
‘Moldovenism’),	as	well	as	the	Russian-speaking	minorities.	Both	these	groups	
of	voters	are	naturally	opposed	to	the	possible	joining	of	Moldova	to	Romania.	
The	largest	pro-European	grouping,	the	Liberal	Democrats	(PLDM)	led	by	for-
mer	Prime	Minister	Vlad	Filat,	strive	every	day	to	avoid	unequivocal	declara-
tions	concerning	their	attitude	towards	Unirea,	in	order	not	to	discourage	their	
pro-Romanian	voters.	However	they	do	react	(although	in	a	more	moderate	way	
than	the	aforementioned	groups)	in	situations	where	Bucharest’s	pro-unifi-
cation	rhetoric	becomes	too	insistent	and	starts	to	threaten	a	rise	in	tensions	
within	the	country.	The	Prime	Minister	of	Moldova,	the	PLDM’s	Iurie	Leanca,	
reacted	to	President	Băsescu’s	declaration	in	November	2013	that	unification	
with	Moldova	was	Romania’s	third	strategic	objective	(after	joining	NATO	and	
the	EU)	by	calling	it	“counterproductive”,	and	said	that	it	“only	creates	artificial	
problems”	and	was	a	“divisive”	move94.	He	also	stressed	that	“a	pro-European	
course	does	not	mean	a	loss	of	sovereignty”.	Reactions	like	this	are	aimed	at	
fending	off	arguments,	from	the	opposition	and	Russia,	accusing	the	pro-Euro-
pean	factions	in	Moldova	of	attempting	reunification	with	Romania	under	the	
pretext	of	European	integration.	Even	the	most	pro-Romanian	group	currently	
involved	in	mainstream	Moldovan	politics,	the	Liberal	Party	(PL)	led	by	Mihai	
Ghimpu,	has	refrained	from	calling	for	unification95,	even	though	it	unambigu-
ously	denies	the	existence	of	a	Moldovan	nation	separate	from	the	Romanians,	
and	highlights	the	cultural	unity	of	‘the	Romanians	on	both	sides	of	the	Prut’.
Political	groups	which	clearly	favour	Moldova	joining	Romania	are	extremely	
marginal,	and	their	total	support	does	not	exceed	1%	of	the	votes.	The	main	pro-
unification	grouping	currently	operating	in	Moldova	is	the	National-Liberal	
Party,	led	by	Vitalie	Pavlicenco.	This	party	won	less	than	0.5%	of	the	vote	in	the	
last	elections.
93	 The	Party	of	Socialists	is	one	of	several	groups	which	have	demanded	the	formal	banning	of	
unionist	movements	in	Moldova.	http://ria.ru/world/20150518/1065201919.html
94	 http://www.mediafax.ro/externe/leanca-declaratiile-de-unire-ale-lui-basescu-ne-scind-
eaza-societatea-si-ne-au-creat-deja-probleme-11814527
95	 When	asked	about	his	attitude	 to	union	 in	an	 interview	 in	March	2010,	Mihail	Ghimpu,	
as	acting	president	of	Moldova,	replied	evasively:	“There	are	problems	that	can	be	solved	
by	 time	and	by	 the	public.	 If	people	want	unification,	neither	Ghimpu	nor	Voronin,	nei-
ther	Putin	nor	Clinton	will	stop	them.”	Source:	http://www.europalibera.org/content/arti-
cle/1970942.html
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In	Romania,	the	mainstream	political	parties	approach	the	issue	of	unification	
with	a	certain	distance,	although	due	to	the	factors	mentioned	above	they	can-
not	and	do	not	want	to	distance	themselves	unequivocally	from	the	idea.	The	
main	force	on	the	Romanian	political	scene,	the	Social-Democratic	Party	(PSD)	
of	Victor	Ponta,	adopts	the	traditional	rhetoric,	according	to	which	the	prac-
tical	unification	of	the	two	countries	will	take	place	when	Moldova	becomes	
a	member	of	the	European	Union,	because	this	will	lead	to	the	abolition	of	bor-
ders,	full	freedom	to	travel,	live	and	work,	and	deep	economic	integration.	As	
demonstrated	by	the	example	of	the	last	presidential	election,	such	rhetoric	has	
undergone	a	certain	revision	under	pressure	from	political	demands.	As	already	
mentioned,	during	the	election	campaign	Ponta	ambiguously	alluded	to	the	idea	
of		the	Great	Unification	of	1918.	The	second	major	political	group	in	Romania,	the	
National	Liberal	Party	(PNL),	has	in	a	certain	sense	rejected	the	idea	of		unifying	
Moldova	and	Romania	(although	it	has	not	said	so	explicitly).	According	to	the	
party’s	official	position,	it	“supports	the	sovereignty,	true	independence	and	
territorial	integrity	of	Moldova,	and	looks	forward	to	bilateral	relations	based	
on	the	principles	of	partnership	and	common	identity”.	In	addition,	Romania	
should	support	Moldova	in	its	“aspirations	to	strengthen	its	statehood”,	in	the	
party’s	opinion96.	On	the	other	hand,	some	statements	by	high-ranking	politi-
cians	in	the	party	(including	its	leader	Crin	Antonescu)	are	not	so	clear,	and	
refer	to	the	possible	union	of	the	two	countries97.
The	main	political	party	in	Romania	which	openly	supports	the	idea	of		unifi-
cation	with	Moldova	remains	the	nationalist	Greater	Romania	Party	(PRM),	
led	by	Corneliu	Vadim	Tudor.	Over	the	years,	however,	this	grouping	has	been	
consistently	losing	the	political	support	of	the	electorate.	In	2000	and	2004	it	
had	its	share	of	success	(earning	19.48%	and	12.92%	of	the	vote	respectively),	but	
now	can	only	rely	on	the	votes	of	about	2%	of	the	electorate,	and	since	2008	it	
has	had	no	representatives	in	parliament.	Pro-unionist	slogans	are	also	used	by	
the	Popular	Movement	Party	(PMP)	created	in	2013,	which	is	primarily	made	
up	of	supporters	of	the	former	President	Traian	Băsescu;	however,	support	for	
this	party	does	not	exceed	5%.	At	the	same	time,	none	of	the	political	parties	
openly	advocating	union	with	Moldova	has	proposed	even	a	general	plan	for	
achieving	this	goal.
96	 http://www.pnl.ro/subpagina/capitolul-12-rela-iile-externe-i-afacerile-europene
97	 The	leader	of	the	PNL,	Crin	Antonescu,	stated	on	30	November	2013	that	the	union	is	“a	na-
tional	aspiration	sought	by	both	banks	of	the	Prut”	and	that	personally	he	“was	obviously	in	
favour	of	it”.	http://adevarul.ro/news/politica/antonescu-despre-unirea-republica-moldo-
va-aspiratie-nationala-ambele-parti-prutului-1_52998806c7b855ff56576fb0/index.html
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4. The public and unirea
The	levels	of	support	for	reunifying	the	two	countries	among	Romanians	are	
very	high,	at	about	70%.	However,	this	figure	falls	off	dramatically	when	re-
spondents	are	informed	about	the	high	financial	costs	of	Moldova’s	possible	
annexation.	Unification	at	any	price	is	demanded	by	only	about	17%	of	Romani-
ans98.	Despite	such	high	support	for	Unirea,	Romanians	pay	very	little	attention	
to	the	current	situation	in	Moldova	and	to	Moldovans	themselves.	Reports	on	
their	eastern	neighbour	appear	relatively	rarely	in	the	Romanian	media,	and	
knowledge	of	the	social	and	political	situation	in	this	country	is	mostly	rudi-
mentary	and	full	of	stereotypes99.	According	to	a	study	conducted	by	the	Soros	
Foundation	in	2011,	up	to	90%	of	Romanians	had	never	visited	Moldova,	68.4%	
did	not	have	any	contacts	with	Moldovan	citizens,	and	only	4.5%	of	respondents	
said	that	they	had	friendly	contacts100.	Up	to	70%	of	respondents	stated	that	they	
had	not	seen	a	single	item	of	information	(TV	reports,	posters,	etc.)	about	Mol-
dova	over	the	last	year,	and	up	to	82%	believe	that	they	know	little	or	very	little	
about	Moldova101.	It	can	be	assumed	that	the	situation	has	improved	slightly	
since	that	poll,	thanks	to	the	activities	of	movements	such	as	Acţiunea	2012,	or	
the	general	rise	in	interest	in	the	region	caused	on	the	one	hand	by	the	ongo-
ing	process	of	Moldova’s	European	integration,	and	on	the	other	hand	due	to	
the	Ukrainian	crisis.	However,	it	does	not	seem	that	any	such	change	will	be	
significant.
98	 See	Kamil	Całus,	Tomasz	Dąborowski,	The	president	of	Romania	supports	unification	with	
Moldova,	 OSW Analyses,	 4	 December	 2013:	 http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analy-
ses/2013-12-04/president-romania-supports-unification-moldova,	 and	 http://www.hot-
news.ro/stiri-esential-16104519-sondaj-ires-trei-sferturi-dintre-romani-declara-acord-
unirea-romaniei-republica-moldova.htm
99	 Generally	Romanians	see	Moldovans	as	their	‘poorer	brethren’,	which	often	leads	to	chau-
vinistic	behaviour.	 In	 January	2014	a	Romanian	 journalist,	Radu	Banciu,	 said	on	a	 radio	
programme	he	was	hosting	that	“Moldova	is	exactly	like	a	Romanian	gypsy	standing	with	
his	hand	out	on	the	Champs	Elysees.	That’s	what	a	Moldovan	is:	a	gypsy	or	a	peasant,	who	
has	been	begging	from	Romania	ever	since	I’ve	known	them.”	Banciu	also	said	during	the	
broadcast	that	female	Moldovan	students	coming	to	Romania	funded	by	scholarships	from	
Bucharest	are	“whores	who	get	pregnant	straight	away	during	the	first	year.”	Source:	http://
www.gandul.info/magazin/radu-banciu-pus-la-punct-de-o-studenta-dupa-ce-i-a-jignit-
pe-toti-moldovenii-sunt-o-curva-dar-nu-am-ramas-gravida-in-primul-semestru-11910998
100	 Republica	Moldova	în	conştiinţa	publică	românească,	http://www.fundatia.ro/republica-
moldova-%C3%AEn-con%C8%99tiin%C8%9B-public%C4%83-rom%C3%A2neasc%C4%83
101	 The	level	of	Romanians’	ignorance	about	the	major	political	issues	in	Moldova	is	evidenced	
by	the	fact	that	up	to	74%	of	respondents	could	not	give	a	correct	answer	to	the	question	
‘What	is	Transnistria?’.
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There	are	currently	no	fully	reliable	polls	on	Moldovan	support	for	the	idea	of	
unification	with	Romania102.	According	to	the	available	studies,	in	2010	union	
was	‘fully’	supported	by	about	10-11%	of	all	the	country’s	inhabitants;	another	
18-20%	of	the	respondents	supported	the	idea	‘to	some	extent’,	although	it	should	
be	stipulated	that	many	Moldovans	understood	‘significant	strengthening’	to	
mean	mutual	cooperation	while	maintaining	Moldovan	statehood.	It	should	
be	estimated	that	the	real	number	of	supporters	of	Unirea	stands	at	about	15%	
(most	voters	who	support	unification	favour	the	Liberal	Party,	whose	backing	
does	not	exceed	10%).
Union	is	supported	in	particular	by	that	part	of	Moldovan	society	which	de-
clares	itself	as	‘Romanians’,	a	significant	portion	of	the	Romanian-speaking	
intelligentsia,	as	well	as	the	small	portion	of	those	who	identify	themselves	as	
Moldovans	and	see	union	as	an	opportunity	to	improve	living	standards.	The	
unambiguous	opponents	of	unification	include	the	Russian-speaking	minori-
ties	living	in	Moldova,	including	in	particular	the	Ukrainians,	Russians,	Bul-
garians	and	Gagauz.	The	Slavs’	resistance	is	primarily	due	to	their	linguistic	
and	cultural	alienation	from	Romania.	These	minorities	fear	that	they	would	
become	second-class	citizens	in	a	Romanian	state,	and	that	their	right	to	cul-
tivate	their	own	traditions	and	languages	would	be	greatly	reduced.	They	are	
also	aware	of	the	possible	political	consequences:	the	deterioration	of	relations	
with	Russia	and	the	likely	difficulties	in	travelling	to	the	east.	The	rather	nega-
tive	image	of	Romania	derived	from	the	Soviet	historical	school,	which	stressed	
that	country’s	fascist	past	above	all,	including	its	participation	in	the	Second	
World	War	against	the	Soviet	Union,	and	the	organisation	of	the	Holocaust	and	
the	extermination	of	the	Roma	population	on	Transnistrian	territory,	is	also	of	
some	significance.
The	Gagauz,	a	Turkish-speaking	people	numbering	about	150,000	who	mostly	
live	in	areas	of	the	Gagauz	Autonomy	in	south	of	the	country,	are	a	special	case	
here.	This	people	is	characterised	by	its	widespread	and	unusually	strong	pro-
Russian	and	anti-Romanian	attitude.	In	the	collective	consciousness	of	this	
nationality,	the	Russians	are	seen	as	the	Gagauz’	defenders	against	external	
threats,	especially	Romania.	Bad	memories	of	the	Autonomy’s	period	under	rule	
102	 Doubts	have	been	raised	about	the	conduct	of	surveys	on	unification	in	Moldova.	Among	
the	respondents	there	has	almost	always	been	an	over-representation	of	people	declaring	
themselves	as	Moldovans	or	Romanians.	Sometimes	the	opinions	of	important	minorities,	
including	the	Gagauz,	have	simply	not	been	taken	into	account.	The	way	in	which	the	ques-
tions	were	formulated	also	leaves	much	to	be	desired.
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from	Bucharest	in	the	interwar	period,	as	well	as	the	rule	of	the	fascist	regime	
of	Ion	Antonescu	during	World	War	II,	are	still	very	vivid	in	the	memory	of	the	
Gagauz.	Moreover,	Romania	is	seen	as	the	instigator	of	the	Moldovan-Romanian	
nationalism	of	the	late	eighties,	and	of	the	ethnic	tensions	which	resulted	from	
it103.	Fear	of	unification	with	Romania	(fuelled	further	by	Băsescu’s	declara-
tion	in	November	2013)	was	one	of	the	main	reasons	for	the	organisation	in	
Gagauzia	of	a	referendum	in	February	2014	(unrecognised	by	Chișinau)	on	how	
integration	with	Moldova	should	proceed,	in	which	98.5%	of	voters	favoured	the	
Russian-sponsored	Customs	Union104.
The	inhabitants	of	Transnistria	display	an	extremely	negative	attitude	towards	
reunification.	The	region	separated	from	Moldova,	among	others,	for	fear	of	Ro-
manianisation	and	being	absorbed	by	Romania.	Transnistria	also	accused	Bu-
charest	of	being	involved	in	the	Transnistrian	war	on	the	Moldovan	side.	Since	
the	end	of	the	military	phase	of	the	conflict,	the	inhabitants	of	Transnistria	
have	remained	afraid	of	a	possible	Moldovan-Romanian	military	intervention	
against	Transnistria,	calculated	by	Chișinau	to	regain	control	of	the	territory.	
The	separatist	republic’s	population	commonly	sees	Romania	as	conducting	
a	consistent	policy	of	aiming	to	annex	Moldova,	and	having	a	vested	interest	in	
absorbing	the	highly	industrialised	region	of	Transnistria.
Social	movements	promoting	Unirea operate	more	or	less	formally	in	both	coun-
tries.	The	largest	and	best-recognised	is	the	Acţiunea	2012	Unionist	Platform,	di-
rected	by	George	Simon,	which	includes	about	40	non-governmental	organisa-
tions,	both	Romanian	and	Moldovan,	and	has	a	significant	number	of	individual	
members.	This	organisation	was	established	in	2011,	and	its	name	commemo-
rates	the	200th	anniversary	of	the	detachment	in	1812	of	Bessarabia	from	the	
Principality	of	Moldavia	and	its	absorption	by	the	Russian	Empire.	This	move-
ment	organises	regular	marches	in	the	streets	of	Chișinau	and	Bucharest,	called	
‘Unionist	marches’.	Traditionally	these	attract	several	thousand	participants	
from	both	countries.	It	also	conducts	educational	and	informational	activities	in	
the	field	of	historical	and	identity	questions,	both	by	organising	summer	schools	
and	courses,	as	well	as	by	publishing	newsletters,	printing	posters,	etc.	This	
organisation	is	funded	by	membership	fees,	tax	allowances	and	direct	subsidies.	
103	 For	more	about	the	Gagauz	question,	and	the	Gagauz’	relations	with	Romania,	see	Kamil	
Całus,	 Gagauzia:	 growing	 separatism	 in	Moldova?,	OSW Analyses,	 10	March	 2014:	 http://
www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2014-03-10/gagauzia-growing-separa-
tism-moldova
104	 Ibid.
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Officially,	the	platform	is	not	supported	(certainly	not	financially)	by	any	politi-
cal	forces	in	either	Romania	or	Moldova.	Moldova’s	pro-European	elite	perceive	
most	of	this	organisation’s	activities	as	a	threat	to	stability	in	the	country.	In	
the	light	of	such	allegations,	on	13	May	2015	Acţiunea	2012’s	leader	George	Simon	
received	a	five-year	ban	on	entering	the	territory	of	Moldova105.	The	movement’s	
activities	are	supported	by	Tinerii	Moldovei	(Youth	of	Moldova),	an	organisa-
tion	advocating	the	unification	of	Romania	and	Moldova,	which	is	made	up	of	
‘Moldovans	born	after	the	fall	of	Communism’106.
5. prospects for unification
The	unification	of	Romania	and	Moldova	is	unlikely	in	the	foreseeable	future.	Ob-
stacles	to	this	process	include	economic,	social,	political,	and	international	issues.
According	to	available	estimates,	in	the	first	five	years	after	Romania’s	putative	
absorption	of	Moldova,	Bucharest	would	have	to	spend	a	minimum	of	30	to	35	
billion	euros	on	adapting	Moldova’s	infrastructure,	administrative	system	and	
legal	system	in	order	for	it	to	operate	within	a	single	country107.	With	Romania’s	
GDP	running	at	US$189	billion	and	an	annual	budget	amounting	to	about	US$70	
billion,	these	costs	would	have	a	major	impact	on	the	country’s	economy108.	Fur-
thermore,	union	would	admittedly	slightly	rise	the	GDP	of	the	common	state	
(by	about	€7	billion),	but	the	GDP	per capita	would	fall	from	the	current	level	of	
US$9499	to	US$8312.
The	economic	question	is	particularly	important	in	the	context	of	public	support	
for	integration.	The	vast	majority	of	Romanians	favour	unity	with	Moldova	–	but	
not	at	any	price.	On	the	other	hand,	support	for	reunification	in	Moldova	has	
not	exceeded	15%	since	the	mid-nineties.
In	addition	to	opposition	from	ethnic	Moldovans,	further	resistance	should	also	
be	expected	from	the	Russian-speaking	minorities,	especially	the	traditionally	
anti-Romanian	Gagauz.	Attempts	to	unite	would	probably	revive	the	Gagauz	
105	 http://infoprut.ro/39424-breaking-george-simion-expulzat-de-sis-din-republica-moldo-
va.html
106	 http://tinerii.md/cine-suntem-noi
107	 http://www.newschannel.ro/stiri/cat-ne-ar-costa-unirea-cu-basarabia/
108	 Illustration	of	how	big	a	financial	effort	it	would	be	for	the	Romanian	state	to	spend	this	
sum	is	the	problem	discussed	earlier	of	Bucharest	assigning	a	sum	of	€100	million	as	part	of	
the	aid	it	promised	to	Moldova	in	2009.
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separatist	movement	rooted	in	the	beginning	of	the	nineties,	which	would	prob-
ably	additionally	be	supported	by	Russia.	Another	socio-political	problem	is	
Transnistria.	The	unification	of	Moldova	with	Romania	would	meet	with	very	
strong	public	resistance	in	the	separatist	region,	as	well	as	a	strong	reaction	
from	Russia	(as	in	the	case	of	Gagauzia).	So	it	seems	that	Moldova	could	only	join	
Romania	without	Transnistria,	and	probably	without	Gagauzia.	Such	a	scenario	
would	require	Chișinau	and	Bucharest	to	recognise	the	independence	of	those	
regions,	or	resolve	their	issues	in	other	ways	(for	example	by	joining	them	to	
Ukraine).	Both	of	these	scenarios	now	seem	very	unlikely.
One	of	the	key	obstacles	on	the	road	to	eventual	unification	is	the	opposition	
of	Moldova’s	ruling	elite.	Moldovan	politicians	realise	that	the	two	countries	
merging	on	a	unitary	model	would	deprive	them	of	their	positions	and	future	
career	prospects,	as	well	as	jeopardising	their	political	and	business	interests.	
It	seems	very	unlikely	that	Moldovan	politicians	could	win	sufficient	popular-
ity	in	a	united	Romanian	state	to	play	as	important	roles	as	they	do	in	Moldova.	
Even	assuming	that	political	unity	would	be	achieved	through	federalisation,	
thus	maintaining	the	existence	of	Moldovan	legislative	and	executive	bodies,	
the	position	of	the	Moldovan	ruling	elite	would	clearly	suffer	anyway.	In	ad-
dition,	due	to	the	relatively	low	support	for	the	idea	of		unification	among	the	
Moldovan	public,	it	does	not	seem	likely	that	those	groups	seeking	to	achieve	
it	could	win	any	real	influence	on	power	in	the	country,	or	shape	the	govern-
ment’s	policies.
The	ruling	elites	in	Bucharest,	contrary	to	their	political	declarations,	are	also	un-
interested	in	a	real	unification	of	Romania	and	Moldova.	Their	unionist	narrative	
is	merely	propaganda:	it	is	intended	for	domestic	consumption	and	is	primarily	
used	to	mobilise	voters	and	emphasise	their	own	patriotism.	Proof	of	this	includes	
the	fact	that	none	of	the	main	groups	actively	support	the	(official	and	unofficial)	
movements	to	promote	union,	such	as	Acţiunea	2012	(except	in	the	short	term,	
for	political	expediency).	Romanian	politicians	realise	that	the	eventual	success	
of	the	unification	project	could	be	disastrous	for	the	future	of	the	Romanian	state,	
not	only	because	of	the	economic	or	political	costs,	but	also	the	expected	rise	in	
tensions	among	ethnic	minorities	both	in	the	newly-attached	Moldova	and	in	
Romania	itself.	Merging	the	two	countries	would	derail	the	idea	of	the	Roma-
nian	unitary	state	advocated	by	Bucharest,	and	would	raise	justified	demands	for	
autonomy	from	the	Hungarian	minority	living	in	the	country,	among	others109.
109	 We	could	expect	that	after	joining	Moldova,	like	the	Gagauz	Autonomy,	Romania’s	Hungar-
ians	would	demand	that	Bucharest	create	a	similar	autonomous	administrative	unit	for	them.
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The	last	category	of	obstacles	is	that	of	the	international	context.	The	EU’s	re-
sponse	to	any	possible	actions	aimed	at	unifying	the	two	countries	is	currently	
hard	to	predict,	but	it	can	be	assumed	that	these	would	be	rather	negative,	es-
pecially	if	the	unification	occurred	after	Romania	entered	the	Schengen	zone.	
The	process	would	not	only	be	costly	from	the	EU’s	perspective,	but	would	also	
jeopardise	security	within	the	Community.	The	EU	member	states’	reaction	to	
a	unification	scenario	can	be	predicted	on	the	basis	of	their	negative	reactions	to	
the	Romanian	policy	of	giving	passports	to	Moldovans,	and	to	Traian	Băsescu’s	
appeal	to	unite	with	Moldova	before	Romania	joined	the	EU.	At	the	same	time,	
we	should	also	expect	objections	from	Russia	(regardless	of	whether	Trans-
nistria	would	also	be	joined	to	Romania),	for	whom	union	would	alter	the	stra-
tegic	situation	in	the	region,	in	connection	with	the	liquidation	of	the	neutral	
Moldova	and	a	de facto	shift	of	NATO’s	borders	to	the	east.	It	seems	very	likely	
that	Ukraine	would	also	react	negatively,	as	it	traditionally	perceives	Romania	
as	a	threat.	Kiev	may	also	fear	that	Romania’s	recovery	of	Moldova	would	set	
a	precedent	for	further	territorial	claims,	including	northern	Bukovina	and	
Bugeac,	which	now	belong	to	Ukraine	but	were	governed	by	Bucharest	in	the	
interwar	period.
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vII. prospecTs For BIlaTeral relaTIons
Everything	indicates	that	the	relationship	between	Bucharest	and	Chișinau	will	
retain	its	special	character.	The	deep	sentimental	attachment	of	the	Romanians	
to	the	lands	of	modern	Moldova	will	shape	the	actions	of	Romanian	politicians	
who,	in	the	future	as	now,	will	raise	the	Moldovan	question	to	win	over	more	
voters.	On	one	hand,	then,	we	should	expect	Romania	to	continue	firmly	sup-
porting	Moldova	in	its	European	integration	process,	and	to	try	and	retain	its	
role	as	Chișinau’s	main	advocate	in	the	international	arena.	On	the	other	hand,	
the	historical	conditions	will	still	pose	a	serious	obstacle	to	the	signing	of	the	
basic	treaty	and	some	other	elements	of	the	border	and	bilateral	agreements.	
Nor	does	it	seem	possible	that	Bucharest	can	openly	distance	itself	from	the	idea	
of	Unirea	in	the	foreseeable	future,	which	will	probably	arouse	regular	ten-
sions	among	the	Russian-speaking	minorities	living	in	Moldova	as	well	as	the	
pro-Russian	and	anti-Romanian	groups,	and	will	also	be	exploited	by	Russian	
propaganda.	However	at	the	same	time,	it	also	seems	quite	unlikely	that	politi-
cal	parties	or	social	movements	supporting	the	union	of	the	two	countries	in	
either	Romania	or	Moldova	will	manage	to	gain	mainstream	support	and	take	
power	in	the	foreseeable	future.	Meanwhile,	both	Klaus	Iohannis’	presidential	
campaign	and	his	activities	since	becoming	President	of	Romania	in	December	
2014	indicate	that	he	will	focus	primarily	on	fighting	corruption	in	the	country	
and	providing	diplomatic	support	to	Moldova	(also	in	the	context	of	Chișinau’s	
efforts	to	obtain	candidate	status	for	EU	membership),	which	will	act	as	a	reas-
suring	factor	and	contribute	to	the	development	of	bilateral	relations110.
Relations	between	the	two	countries,	burdened	as	they	are	with	enormous	his-
torical	and	cultural	baggage,	will	therefore	depend	largely	on	the	actions	of	
Romania,	as	has	become	traditional;	but	the	main	factor	influencing	them	will	
primarily	remain	what	kind	of	political	forces	come	to	power	in	Chișinau.	If	pro-
Russian	groups	gain	power,	this	will	likely	unfreeze	the	currently	‘frozen’	prob-
lems,	and	bring	about	a	serious	deterioration	in	bilateral	relations.	Indeed,	these	
forces	will	aggressively	emphasise	the	separateness	of	Moldovans	and	inflame	
anti-Romanian	sentiments.	However,	as	long	as	Moldovan	policy	is	shaped	by	
110	 An	example	of	Iohannis’	rhetoric	on	the	issue	of	unification	is	his	commentary	on	the	dem-
onstration	by	unionists	on	16	May	2015	in	Chișinau’s	central	square.	The	Romanian	Presi-
dent	said	then	that	supporters	of	Unirea	must	realise	that	the	most	important	issue	is	cur-
rently	 bringing	Moldova	 into	 the	European	Union,	which	Romania	will	 support.	 http://
independent.md/iohannis-comenteaza-protestele-din-republica-moldova-pentru-promo-
va-ideea-de-unire-cu-romania/#.VVsBlvmqhHw
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the	current	pro-European	groups,	they	will	probably	manage	to	avoid	serious	
misunderstandings	with	Bucharest,	as	that	would	not	be	in	their	interest.
The	development	of	cooperation	will	also	be	fostered	in	subsequent	years	by	
the	development	(which	has	been	noticeable	for	some	time)	of	the	formation	
and	consolidation	of	a	Moldovan	identity	which	affirms	its	Romanian	roots	and	
does	not	deny	the	fact	of	the	‘Romanian-ness’	of	the	language	in	daily	use	or	
the	common	history	between	the	two	states.	In	connection	with	this,	cultural	
cooperation	will	continue	to	develop.	Romania’s	importance	for	the	Moldovan	
economy	will	continue	to	increase,	because	of	rising	trade,	new	investments	
and	the	development	of	distribution	systems	which	can	supply	Moldova	with	
Romanian	gas	and	electricity.	The	process	of	Moldova’s	European	integration	
will	play	a	very	important	context	in	the	development	of	bilateral	relations.	Un-
doubtedly,	the	country’s	eventual	accession	to	the	EU	would	lead	to	a	significant	
strengthening	of	the	relationship.	In	the	foreseeable	future,	however,	Moldovan	
membership	of	the	EU	is	unlikely.
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Map 1.	The	Principality	of	Moldavia	and	Wallachia	at	the	turn	of	the	19th	century
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Map 2.	Borders	of	Romania	in	the	1930s,	the	so-called	‘Great	Romania’
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Map 3.	Contemporary	Romania	and	Moldova
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